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CHAPTER I 
TRIE SEARGi FOR MEANINGFUL ILLUSION 
Three years before he died, Henry Janes had come to feel that 
his work was a "tangle of temporal differences that revealed, after-
all, nothing of the depths; references as fleeting as C. Henry's 
slang, flavours mistaken for essences, split hairs, not dissected 
anatomies,"* 
It is pertinent that in Jaaes's misgivings here quoted he refers 
to 0. Henry for self-comparison: 0. Henry of the facile tale with 
the trick ending, tale-teller extraordinary, but artist seldom. For 
Jases cams closest to failing as an artist when h@ seems to be purely 
a story-teller, a fabricator, a word conjurer who pulls us along 
hypnotically by the spell of his rhetoric, a writer who merely enter­
tains us, leaving us with no philosophy after the illusion. He cones 
precipitously close to this in stories like "The Beast in the Jungle" 
and "The As pern Papers"—tales fro» which only the discerning reader 
can draw a deeper Bteaniag, As a story teller Janes is also like his 
modem counterpart (in style, not content), William Faulkner, who, on 
cursory examination, seems to be a carnival charlatan, a clever artist 
who plays a shell gane with his reader, trying to convince hia there 
%. Forster Damon, /toy Lowell, as recorded in Van Wyck Brook's 
New England Indian Su»»er, 1865-1915 (New York: E, P. Dutton Co., 
I n c .  ,  l W o )  ,  p .  4 0 6 .  — — —  
2 
is a moral seed beneath the convolutin^ shell of his story, when 
(except for the discerning) there doesn't sees to be one there at 
all. 
If Jaraes were merely a story teller, a magician who beguiles 
his reader into suspending his disbelief only so long as his words 
were effective, he would be suspect as an artist. His technique wight 
be admired, but his creative insight would be questioned* This, in 
fact, is James's position in literature today. As a craftsman, as 
a dedicated artist, he is above suspicion. Almost every critic 
maintains the indebtedness of the modem literary technician to Janes. 
But almost every critic qualifies his praise by saying that the world 
James portrays seems to have too little relation to reality as they 
see it, particularly the world mirrored in his later works. Critics 
admire James's portrayals of "fine consciences," but at the sane tiise 
they imply that these consciences never have existed other than in 
the concentricity of rainds—Jaaes's and the reader's; or that if 
they have existed, they so little reflect a representational world 
that they can safely be ignored. 
It is Joseph Conrad who referred to Jwes as "the historian of 
fine consciences."2 In fact, it is Conrad who has said some of the 
Host complimentary and enlightening things about Janes. Yet despite 
the fact that James himself often referred to the novel as "history," 
Joseph Conrad, "The Historian of Fine Consciences," essay in 
Hie Question of Henry James, (ed.) F. i*<*. Dupee (New York: Henry 
3 
this might have seemed—-even coming from Conrad—a limiting tribute, 
since to Jaaes the word "history" had a vary particular (even private) 
meaning. "History," to hi® was not the "pigeon-holed and documented" 
chronicle which he associated with Zola, and which he referred to as 
"experience by imitation.""' The artistic image "is always," he says, 
"superior [italics nine] to the thing itself,"4 
As a historian who diligently imitates the actual (the ••temporal," 
as he calls it in his daaning self-evaluation, p. 1), imbuing it with 
no "essence" of its own, James is purposely not as convincing as he 
at first seess. Who, for instance, could believe that one of his 
aost "realistic" characters, Christopher Newman, in The American,is 
at all true to the actual? Such a person, in real life, would have 
to be endowed with the physical drive and energy of a tycoon, yet be, 
at the same tirae, as sensitive as Henry James himself. 
Rather, it is because Janes fails as a historian (in the usual 
sense of the term) that he succeeds as an artist. He is an historian 
only to the extent that he convinces us that the individual kind of 
reality he has captured is not raerely fanciful. 
Sir Phillip Sidney has said that art is more philosophical than 
history and more concrete than philosophy. Goethe, the romantic-
classicist, said that art gives an illusion of a higher reality; and 
% 
Henry Jaaes, "Eoile Zola, Hie Future of the Novel (ed.) Leon 
Edel (New York: Vintage Books, l§S5f»y,'"p.""' 'i'sST ———— 
4Ibid,, "Hustave Flaubert," p. 1S4. 
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when he used the word illusion in this way, Goethe was not meaning only 
the image art creates by being something other than reality, lie was 
rephrasing the classical concept that initation is a creative act. 
The artist does not necessarily imitate life exactly m it appears. 
Naturalists in American literature, such as Frank Norris, Theodore 
Dreiser and Sinclair Lewis did this; and they too often succeeded, 
creating in the process what Irving Babbitt has called a "literal 
deception," or, as the critic, Yvor Winters, has rephrased the terra, 
"the fallacy of imitative form," That is, the reality the literary 
naturalists captured (Zola and, even, Flaubert being the European 
practitioners of the xaethod), a reality which may be literally true, 
is still a deception because, for all its pretensions of capturing 
"real" life—titat is, of evading the "illusory"—it is illusory still, 
and it is possibly no less illusory than is an "idealized," classical 
illusion, which makes "illusion" an integral part of reality, 
The problem, of course, is what is "reality" and what is "illusion"?— 
a question anyone would be foolhardy to try to answer absolutely. And 
this is just the point. The classicist does not presuae to answer it 
absolutely. He does not try to get absolutely beyond illusion. With­
out presuming to limit reality (whatever it is) the way the naturalists, 
for instance, limit it to its purely objective properties, the classic 
cist uses illusion for whatever value it has as a point of reference 
reflecting back to reality. He approaches the problem of reality and 
5 
illusion more circumspectly, more indirectly,5 rather than attempting 
to evade it by defining it too easily and thus dismissing it too 
shallowly. Thus he gives to the question of reality and illusion the 
latitude the problem denands, and, at the same tirae, he keeps it rsore 
inclusive. If he limits it at all, he limits it by insisting that 
reality is also illusion. 
This, of course, is paradoxical; and to approach the problem of 
paradox is only to draw very near to the core of Henry James*s fiction. 
To examine one is to exa»ine the other. To pre sums, for instance, 
that realistic art continues to present reality only so long as it 
continues to present illusion is to presume that life, as a continuum, 
is also illusion. And to presutae that art should do no sore or less 
than imitate this illusive continuum is to be more paradoxical still. 
But this—it will be discovered—is exactly what Jams demands of the 
artist. Inevitably one is thrown into soae consideration of the 
mystical realm, where the critical laind finds all its disciplines 
thwarted.6 For as long as there are contrasts, as long as there is 
C 
James's method of indirection will be examined sore closely in 
the next chapter. 
6It is not the purpose of this thesis to exaaine James as a 
potential mystic (which, by almost any criterion he is not); yet 
he realises mystical kind of awareness by some of the sm means 
particularly in his use of paradox, in his attempt to airror, rather 
than to eliminate contraries, etc. (to be discussed later)'". The 
paradox of the mystical experience, as asserted by all mystics* pseudo 
or otherwise (by those who profess it authoritatively as well as by 
those who profess it less authoritatively, perhaps, only because 
thoy sees less sure of the artistic taeans) is that the experience 
6 
play of light and shadow, of illusion and reality, paradox will find 
expression. Hie irony of paradox is that it is always as much a 
reflection of the beholder's eye as it is of life itself. Even the 
word is only an arbitrary ftilcrura by which one balances contraries 
which possibly do not exist at all in total reality. Dualistic words 
like "good and evil," "beauty and ugliness," etc., aanage to halve 
the world into contraries which oay not exist at all except in the 
minds of those who use thetaj and in this sense paradox may be no more 
central than the illusions it opposes. Irving Babbitt, for instance, 
says that one of the »ost "delicate of tasks" is: 
. . .  t o  d e t e r m i n e  whether a paradox occupies a 
position more or less central than the convention 
to which it is opposed [and that] a somewhat similar 
problem is to determine which of two conventions 
has the greater degree of centrality, for me con­
vention nay as compared to another seem highly 
cannot be truly conveyed, iaigistically or otherwise, much less judged 
or defined. As Eckhart says, The "unspeakable" quality the aystic 
apprehends "hath no image"—a staggering assumption which attacks 
conventional conceptions of reality which, by most definitions, are 
not averse to imigistic or conceptual translation. What this 
Means is that all systics* pseudo or otherwise, who try to communi­
cate the experience (that is, to translate total reality) practice 
a paradox no less bewildering than the paradoxes they express. 
Mysticism infuriates the critical Rind most of all, because 
the aystic asserts that he has apprehended a reality of which the 
nan-mystic is not only unaware (the awareness is the experiences 
everyone is a potential toys tic at every moaent7"~^ut is not aware 
of it); but furthermore he asserts that even if the experience is 
in any way communicated (which, of course, would be, in every case 
a compromise with total communication), the experience still cannot 
be judged critically. By William J«ses*s criterion of "the 
fruits," the mystical experience "words," if at all, only for the 
individual who experiences it; and, in every case, the person who 
experiences it is "tWe sole judge* 
7 
7 paradoxical, 
Babbitt here is riot trying to dispose of paradox as a useful 
entity; ho is trying to bring it into perspective. That is, he does 
not want to permit it to be forced, arbitrarily, out of perspective 
as a respectable measuring tool, as a useful means of judging 
illusions. 
As long as people are confused about reality and illusion, 
paradox will find expression in art no less readily than it appears 
in life, tod the nore complex the Binds that view it, the more 
complex will be the paradoxes demanded. If a work of art does not, 
for ironical teaperawents, somehow embody paradox, it will itself 
beeoiae, for a large portion of the public, an object of irony. This 
is the public James was referring to when he said, in "The Future 
of the Novel"? 
. . .  T h e r e  is . . .  a n  a d r a i r a b l e  a i n o r i t y  of 
intelligent persons , , . for whan the very for® 
[of the novel] has, equally at its best and its 
worst, been ever a mockery ... [a class] . » . 
beginning to be visably augmented by a different 
circle altogether, the group of the formerly 
subject, but now estranged, the deceived and bored, 
those for whoa the [novel] too decidely fails to 
live up to its possibilities.8 
Only the most complex (though net, necessarily, the aost deeply 
7Irving Babbitt, Rousseau and Romanticista (Boston and Mew 
York, Houghton Mifflin &>., 143irr ]>. 246. 
^lienry James, lite Future of the Novel, op. cit., p. 56, 
s 
profound) art achieves the Illusion of providing a play of paradoxes 
which is not easily sounded. This kind of art so interweaves the 
stuff of reality and illusion that even critical winds can temporarily 
resign to it. What distinguishes this artistic fusion is that the work 
of art remains an illusion which nore effectively escapes irony on the 
part of the beholder (and admitted illusion is_illusion which has been 
disproved ironically) and wore durably remains paradox. It remains 
paradox because it wore expertly balances a vaster combination of 
opposing entities: the idea and the "picture" (Janes's dichotomies), 
the abstract idea and the concrete fact, the symbol and the image, the 
i1lusory and the real. Purely imitative art, which is flat and un-
eliptical, seldom achieves this balance, because its paradoxes are 
too easily dissolved. 
In drama, for instance, our minds are induced into a play by 
what Coleridge calls the "suspension of disbelief." But because of 
the opposites Which mm apparent between an illusory tale and the 
very renl~see&ing situations, our minds are forced to make a choice 
between the illusion as it is perforned and reality as we know it to 
be. The necessity of choosing is what fives the play any power it 
has. Unconsciously, intuitively perhaps, we do not want to make this 
choice. We want to be involved in the illusion. This is the romantic 
faculty of the raind* We want to be suspended in disbelief. But 
consciously, rationally, no doubt, we are forced to choose between the 
real and the illusory. In fact, it is just this critical, ironical 
faculty of our minds that lets us surrender to the illusion in the 
9 
first place, it knows that no matter how realistic or frightening 
the illusion may becone, it is still only an illusion. The choice 
the rational faculty of the mind makes, if the play is bad, is satire 
of roraance, of illusion, because the play has not had the power to 
suspend our disbelief. In that case we become ironists—ironical 
critics laughing at our desire for illusion. 
If the artist hopes to capture complex winds he nust create an 
illusion in which the most complex paradoxes reign. His work must 
be a consciously controlled atteapt to reflect life's paradoxicalness 
Itselfj that is, the greatest mystery of life, which is its ambiguity. 
If the work does this, it will involve the reader emotionally as well. 
It will involve hint emotionally, because if he becomes involved 
intellectually in judging illusions, he will have to work himself out 
of this mysterious substance to the degree that ho is trapped in it. 
He will be involved emotionally, in other words, to the degree that 
he is in illusion; and to the degree that he is bothered by illusion 
and Is anxious to becoae grounded in reality once iaore, he will be 
emotional. And to Janes to involve the reader emotionally, to "bewilder" 
hi», is to win a ore titan italf the artistic battle. 
In this sense, art reflects man*® confusion about the difference 
between reality and illusion. It plays upon his inclination to think 
he knows, at each raonent, what is real and what is illusory and can 
distinguish between each to the credit of his sanity. Vet it involves 
hi» in an illusion which will cause hiis to be temporarily confused about 
tiiis distinction. If the illusion is responsibly presented, it will 
10 
be one which the reader can unravo1 and which will lead hira to a more 
meaningful illusion beyond it (that is, to a new "transcendant" reality, 
beyond mere illusory entertainment or literal deception}. To the ex­
tent that it does this—that it draws him through illusion and out of 
it again and stands hiia on his feet again in apparent "reality," it 
leads him out of paradox; that is, it forces hie to realize that desire 
for illusion at the same time one really desires reality is itself 
paradoxical. 
If the work of art deserts him in a state of paradox, in a state 
of ambiguity, in a state of confusion about what illusion and reality 
are (in the particular case); if, that is, it does not stand him on 
his feet, even if wily temporarily, in a new kind of transcendent 
illusion, the work is itself, finally, paradoxical, and therefore 
Q 
ambiguous* 
A work of art convinces a reader that either reality is ambiguous 
and paradoxical and contradictory, or that he is. Art thus accepts 
paradox and demands an illusion which cannot be dissolved. Yet if the 
paradoxical illusion is respensibily presented; that is, if it is 
distinguished by a classical propensity for demanding and making 
distinctions, it will be one which can be dissipated—if only for the 
purpose of providing temporary respite from paradox and illusion, 
9 A case in point is Melville's, The Confidence Man, in no sense 
ambiguous in itself. Absolutely misantKroplc in that it puts out of 
mind the light of hope for all man, and thus is internally consistent, 
it is still paradoxical in that the artist's purpose in revealing this 
truth to man, that there is no truth in the species, seems contradictory. 
It begs pity. 
11 
generally. 
That Is, art, besides reflecting life which seems to be illusory, 
to be paradoxical, provides man with the opportunity of making dis­
tinctions, and, classically, presumes that he can. To provide this 
opportunity for choice is to supply the quality which gives the work 
artistic "transcendence" beyond mere entertainment or literal imita­
tion. But to provide it does not presume that asn can get entirely 
beyond illusion, altogether, if only because, in itself, art can 
never divorce itself from the necessity of providing illusion; that 
is, of providing something other than apparent reality. 
The final assumption, of course, is that reality (whatever it 
is) is part-and-parcel of one's involvement in the act of realizing 
life, the act of choosing, of tasking distinctions, of judging between 
one arbitrary illusion and another, the act of appreciation. It is 
not an absolute escape from illusion altogether. This point will be 
examined more closely in Chapters II and III, but, briefly, involve­
ment in mking distinctions is presumed to be note central than not 
making them. 'Tell rae of what an artist is," Janes says—trying to 
define the moral function of art—"and I shall express to you at once 
10 
his boundless freedons Mid his "moral" reference." Or as he says 
core explicitly. "The moral sense of a work of art [isj the anount 
11 
of felt life concerned in producing it." 
10James, The Art of the Hovel, op. cit., p. 51. 
11Ibid., p. 49. 
12 
"The affair of the painter is not the immediate, it is the 
reflected field of life, the real® not of application, but of 
appreciation [italics mine]—a truth that makes our measure of effect 
altogether different."12 
"Art is essentially selection, and it is selection whose main 
care is to be typical, to be inclusive,"13 
Jams's final stance is that of the discriminating artist, not 
tliat of the purely imitative one. "Huaanity is what raw have in 
comon with each other, not what they have in distinction."14 "The 
essence of morality is to survey the whole field."15 
Yet Janes has been criticised, and he critixed himself for not 
having maintained artistic balance; he condems himself for being 
too jsueh of a literalist, of dealing too nuch in the "temporal," 
of not capturing the "essences," the "depths," He implies that in 
his belief that the novel is an "intense and exquisite correspondence 
with life,"16 he has emphasized the word "correspondence" and has 
slighted the word "immense"j in other words, that he has been too 
iaitative, rather than "consolingly," "transcendent*"17 He implies 
that in his desire for the novel to be "history" (since history, he 
12Ibid., p. 57 
13lbld., p. 20 
14Ibld», p. 77 
15Ibld„ p. 25 
16Ibid., p. 23 
I7Ibid», p. 151. 
13 
says, "is also a representation of life") ,*8 and in his avowal that 
19 its only obligation is that it be "interesting," he has not lived 
up to his ethical belief that the "essence of molality is to survey 
the whole field, 
Furthermore, he implies that in his concern to be a story-teller 
and "capture the color of life,"20 and in his anxiousness not to 
involve himself in his novel by "noralixing" or by authorial intrusions 
of any sort—philosophically or otherwise—he has been almost too 
diligent and has sacrificed philosophy and morality altogether* 
Finally, he implies that by keeping so religiously uninvolved 
in his illusion, in order not to shatter or overly influence it, and 
by being so supremely (alisost too-rionically) in control of his 
medium, he has failed to reflect in hiraself that sost general and 
classical of human qualities upon which he himself says all art and 
drama depend: tit at is, the "precious human liability to fall into 
traps and be bewildered."21 
lite answer to the question of whether or not James thinks of 
himself as aerely a historian or »rely a story teller is relevant 
to what G. Mattheissen calls the "specific gravity" in James's work— 
the quality that gives it balance, which nakes it more than a literal 
i8Ibld., p. 6 20Ibid., p. 27. 
19Ibld., p. 11. 21Ibid.. p. 56. 
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transcription of life, sore, even, than a "history of fine consciences" 
(sufficiently ' •non-literal" though the words "fine consciences," al­
ready argue such history to be) » ... In other words, the quality 
or "essence" which gives it a "higher reality." But the more general 
question about James's own personal ambiguity; that is, his apparent 
refusal to become himself dominated, temporarily, by illusion (but, 
instead, to remin always ironically aloof from it), at the same time 
he maintains temporary involvement in illusion to be the most general 
hunan condition . , • is relevant to the general human ambiguity re­
garding reality mid illusion—that is, the general human bewilderment 
about what true morality is, what true aestheticis® is, what true 
irony (taeaningful irony) is, what true involvement is. 
These distinctions will be examined briefly in the chapter to 
follow. The purpose of this introduction has been to explore briefly 
this important distinction between art and raw life and Jones's own 
concern with this distinctions but—generally—James's work seems 
anbipuous because he seems to be an aesthete about good and evil; 
and in terns of estheticiss his works seem ambiguous because he seens 
to be a moralist about beauty and ugliness. Instead of being morally 
introspective (for instance, like Melville or Hawthorne), he is a 
brooding (that is, morally introspective) esthete. His esthetic con­
cern seems indistinguishable fron morality: in him they seem to 
aaaount alraost to the same thing. 
Such confusion night be personally feasible: Jaaes, as a person, 
is under no obligation to be consistent. But as an artist, a classical 
IS 
artist (which is the only kind he truly admired), he is obligated 
to be both entertaining and inclusive; he must provide a meaningful 
illusion which is discriminating and causes his readers to be like­
wise discriminating. If, however, he is confused about the moral and 
aesthetic implications of his artistic illusions and does not dis­
tinguish at some point between thes; if, that is, he is merely writing 
out of confusion, then he loses his reactors in a labyrinth of illusion. 
It is true, of course, that life itself say be an undecipherable 
labyrinth of illusion which cannot be fathoaed. Janes himself implies 
thiss 
. . .  T h e  r e a s o n  i s  o f  c o u r s e  t h a t  l i f e  h a s  n o  d i r e c t  
sense whatever for the subject and is capable, luckily 
for us, of nothing but splendid waste. Hence the 
opportunity for the sub lime economy of art, which 
rescues, which saves, and hoards and "banks," investing 
and reinvesting these fruits of toil in wondrous use­
ful "works" and thus caking up for us, desperate spend­
thrifts that we all naturally are, the most princely 
of incomes. It is the subtle secrets of that system, 
however, that are meanwhile the charming study, with 
an endless attraction, above all, in the question--
endlessly baffling indeed—of the method at the heart 
of the madness. . . 22 
In this sense, to portray that confusion, as it appears, is not 
necessarily artistic falsification; it is merely literal representa­
tion* 
It is also true that life, portrayed in an unalloyed state of 
confusion, could be presented as a very entertaining illusion for 
readers not concerned with asking distinctions. James himself said 
of this kind of writing! 
22Ibid., p. 52. 
16 
, , . Zola "pulled it off," as we say, supremely, 
in that he neve; but once found himself obliged 
to quit, to our vision, his magnificent treadmill 
of the pigeonholed and documented—the region we 
may qualify as that of experience by imitation . . . 3̂ 
In this sense, to capture such an illusion is not necessarily artistic 
falsification, either; it is merely a good story. But if the artist 
is fulfilling the classical function of art, which is to make illusion 
iseaaingful, he will be neither merely a good story-teller, providing 
an entertaining illusion, nor merely an historian, accurately por­
traying a literally true fact of existence; his work will be a 
combination of the two. 
He way, as a person, in other words, as a human being, be un­
concerned about the consequences of illusion; but as an artist, as 
a supremely human (not super-human) entity, he must lead his deluded 
readers, temporarily, out of illusion, by making some kind of 
distinctions (whether moral, esthetic, ironic, romantic, misanthro­
pic) between life's ambiguous contraries of good and evil, beauty and 
ugliness, irony and romance, reality and illusion. It is the 
artist's success or failure in being consistent at this by which h© 
will be judged. 
Hie artist (and Jaiaes certainly fits this category when properly 
interpreted) penetrates to the "ideal" through the welter of the 
"actual" and succeeds—as Irving Babbitt says: "without ceasing to 
be individual"—in suggesting the universal.24 Hi at is (in Coleridge 
23Ibid., p. 189. 24Sabbitt, oji. cit., p. 17. 
17 
definition of the terms, although not necessarily in Coleridge's 
practice of that definition), he cotabines the illusory and the real 
and tries to make (and cause to be made) distinctions between thera, 
lie does not concern himself with one to the exclusion of the other. 
As James himself concludes: 
» . , The answer nay be after all that mysteries 
here elude us, that general considerations fail 
or mislead, and that even the fondest of artists 
need ask no wider range titan the logic of the 
particular case. The particular case, or in other 
words his relation to a given subject, once the 
relation .is" esi'abTisKe?,1roans' in itseIf" a little 
world o# exercise and agitation. Let hia hold 
himself perhaps si^remely fortunate if he can sseet 
half the questions with which that air alone may 
swara ... 
. • • A conclusion which aeons to fall back, totally, on the "actual," 
except for the extensions beyond it gained by the artist's relation 
to the fact* and except for the extensions gained froa the "logic 
of the particular case"—which (it will be discovered) is the pro­
pensity of the particular case for anomalous interpretation. 
25 
"James, cit», p, S3. 
GiAPTBR II 
CI RCUMLOCUTICW J "THE METHOD AT TOE HEART OF THE MADNESS" 
In discussing the artist as a character in James's fiction, 
R. P. Blacksur says that an artist "cm©® to life only as he ceases 
to be an artistj he cones to life, In a word, only when he fails as 
an artistj awl he fails, in a word, only when the conditions of life 
overcome hiia at the expense of his art."* 
Blackmur here is discussing Janes's success, or lack of success, 
at waking fictional artists in his stories appear to be real hurjan 
beings. This is different, incidentally, frort the artist's problem 
of making ordinary human beings appear to be real, because of the 
artist's propensity, when dealing with fictional artists, of con-
fusing hisself with his creations and thus shattering his illusion— 
usually by making his fictional artist appear to be overly percep­
tive, to seem too real, and, therefore, unbelievable as illusions. 
This is also different from the problem of the artist who quite 
consciously intrudes into his illusion, as himself, prodding his 
illusion along with chummy pats here and there—an obvious reflection 
on the reader's credulous desire for illusion, which Jaraes was seldora 
guilty of perpretrating. 
The second problem that of making ordinary people appear to 
P. Blackaur, "In the Country of the Blue," essay in The 
Question of Henry James, op. cit., p. 198. 
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be real in fiction—Jaiaes solved by never dealing too literally 
with "The Real Using." In his story by that name, he catalogues 
the problem of a painter who is unable to use a down-on-their luck 
"real" lady and "real" gentlesan as models for a portrait fw is 
doing of a "typical lady and gentlenan," because they are too real; 
that is, they permit hi® no latitude for invention. The "real 
thin ""--which they obviously are—intrudes too pressing ly upon 
the trail seen dan t illusory thing he wants to create beyond their 
factual literalness. To solve his problem he goes out into the 
street and brings in a lower-class man and woman who can be dressed 
up to appear like a lady md gentleman and thus provide hiss free 
rein for invention.2 
This story is relevant to the artistic problera of the artist 
who is trying to make a fictional artist appear realj because such 
an artist, also, if he intrudes too obviously upon his illusion by 
using himself as a modal, intrudes in just the way the real lady 
and gentleman do in "The Real Thing." 
Actually, Jaaes seldoa intrudes in this way because, if anything, 
he is too self-effacing, too unwilling to reveal hiiaself in any way 
at all and thus draw to himself the penetrating glances of people 
*The fact that the artist in "The Real Thing" cannot (as Walter 
Clark points out in a recent essay in Chrysalis ["The Writer and the 
Professor," 11 (Spring, 1962), p. 60 -10/^ )1)0 taken seriously as an 
artist is irrelevant to the general artistic problem of dealing with 
reality md illusion. The artist in James's story is, quite obviously, 
a romantic, and he over-emphasised the abstract possibilities of life 
at the expense of the concrete; but he could still, in what Janes 
calls the "crystaline" maimer (refer to discussion of this topic in 
Chapter III) portray a real fact of existence and, yet, hiiaself re­
main in illusion about it. 
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who search out flaws in artists and assume even self-effacement to 
be one of then, Self-effacetaent is actually James• s greatest 
strength—and Ms cleverest ruse.3 
James never lets his feet show behind those of his fictional 
artist, because when he portrays an artist, the artist is portrayed 
as an object of irony, and is sure to reveal his own feet of clay 
in tise. Unlike Christopher Nevnum, James's business man in The 
American, who is too penetrative to be an ordinary business am, yet 
not penetrative enough, either, to be Jaiaes, and therefore is not a 
literal transcription of life, but m artist's invention—Janes's 
artists in his stories are wore penetrating than ordinary artists, 
but also not as penetrating as Janes, himself, and therefore cannot 
be taken as a literal transcription of Henry James. Ihey are some* 
thing less—in the sense that he is ironically removed from then, 
but they are something more, too, in the sense that they are also 
A ruse, incidentally, less successfully achieved by Halter Clark 
in the essay just referred to, Clark—no less self-effacing, 
personally, than James**'tries, in this very "Jaaesian" essay, for the 
saae kind of effect—(an effect he fails to achieve, fortunately, in 
his book The City of TreaMing Leaves, which is about a young artist 
trapped, charmingly and naively in young illusions, who finally, like 
James, comes to accept "the logic of the particular case")—except 
that Clark, in this essay, is self-effacing for a very different 
reason: he doesn't want—since they are obviously very painful to 
him—his "critical shoes" to show. Hie virtue of this essay—other 
than the penetrating light it throws on James—is that it finally 
publicly reveals how well shod Clark is in this respect—and now 
perhaps he can return to fiction like The Track of the Cat (his best 
work), where he hides "artistic feet" antT "critical' slibesw together, 
and lets only his face show through. 
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artistic creations. 
And, ironically, these artists achieve both stances by beinr 
slightly dense. In fact, Jaraes solves most of his problems of reality 
and illusion, in fiction, by making not only his artists, but also 
each of his characters—even the most penetrating ones—appear to 
be slightly dense. lie does this at the risk of appearing—teisnorari ly— 
to b© slightly dense himself. He does this because, ironically, the 
reader demands that he be.4 
But this facet of the Jamesian technique will be discussed later. 
What is pertinent now is that Elackmur1s declaration, that a fictional 
artist canes to life only when the conditions of life overcome hi® at 
the expense of his art, is even sore interesting when applied to the 
artist in general. In this sense, it seeras relevant to James's pro-
bless. 
Applied to Jaaes, it would iaply that the conditions of true 
life, fro® which Jaraes (for saany, anyway) seemed to be too far distant, 
did not often enough overcome his ironic, esthetic sense (the self-
effacing James). It would iaply that if Jaraes himself (disregarding, 
altogether, Jaraes'§ fictional artists) had been less in control of 
his illusion, less ironic, he would have been more human, and that 
^•Therefor© it is that the wary reader for the most part warns 
the novelist against making his characters too intrepretative of the 
muddle of fate, or in other words too divinely, too priggishly clever. 
'Give us plenty of bewilderment,' this monitor seeas to say, 'so long 
as there is plenty of slashing exit in bewilderment too. But don't we 
beseech you, give us too mich intelligence; for intelligence—well, 
endangers; endangers not perhaps the slasher himself, but the very 
slashing, the subject matter of any self-respecting story. . 
(The Future of the Novel, op.cit., p. 56) 
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the world h© portrays would be wore human, too, and, therefore, more 
realistic. 
The isaplication, stated differently, is that the reality Jaraes 
tried to capture seems too stratified; it does not see® truly repre­
sentative, as classical art demands it be* By limiting his scope 
to highly critical consciousnesses—*or, at least, to people who are 
highly developed, critically and esthetically~-Jaaes's work seems 
unrealistic.5 
6lackwur also says that if the artist "sees," his vision 
disappears in his work, which is the "Country of the Blue"--the 
"Country of the Slue" being James's tern for artistic excellence— 
or as he calls it, in referring to Plmubert's Madasae Bovary— 
"classical dignity."6 
Pursuing the line of "implication" (for whatever distance it 
provides in developing a general argument), and once more applying 
Blackiaur's quotes, not to James's artists, but to Jastes hiaself—this 
last declaration of Blackraur's implies, indirectly, that James as a 
person (as an artistic person—taking the "classical stance") nay, 
5This is no different, again, from saying that the works of 
Frank Morris or Theodore Dreiser, by limiting their scope to 
consciousnesses less critical—or, at least, to people vastly 
underdeveloped esthetically or morally, also sees unrealistic, 
because their work, while implying reality, captures only half of 
it, since life is made up of both extrenes. 
^One of the few worlcs of Flaubert's with which Jases had 
s^all quarrel. 
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himself, reach the "Country of the Blue," but that his worts say not— 
the broader implication being that art is a discipline which possibly 
saves Jaaes from himself, but only at the expense of his keeping his 
human propensities out of his writing (those propensities by which 
the world sight overcome him at the expense of his art and thus, by 
Blacknur's criteria, raake him hcob»® to life"—thereby satisfying 
ordinary reader's desire for sore "realistic" art). 
To be wore general, still, this is like saying that a mystic 
(with whose discipline James is linked less often than he should be, 
since his approach to mystery is nearer this plane of reference 
than is generally realized)^ way once have had a vision of ultimate 
reality ("classical dignity" in James's terms), but be unwilling or 
unable, to translate it adequately in terras of words or images (which, 
of course, are only symbolical approximations of reality), for fear 
that if he does translate it, it will be a compromise at the expense 
of his personal solvency—the general implication here being that both 
the work of art and the artist cannot contain the experience or 
knowledge concurrently, that one or the other aust be sacrificed. 
And this elaborate presupposition is all relevant, because Jams 
does appear to reflise to immerse himself, for whatever greater knowledge 
g 
may be found there, in what Conrad has called "the destructive 
7 James as a "mystic"—in method—not in vision, is discussed 
briefly in the last section of this thesis. 
O 
And what my be found there—as Kurtz discovered—could be only 
"the horror, the horror." ' 
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9 element." Instead, he appears to hold back and create, in lieu, a 
different kind of reality10 which seems to contain elements even saore 
corapactly complex thai life, and paradoxes and ironies, if not nor© 
profound, then more ingenious. 
As Joseph Warren Beach quotes Herbert Reads "James gives a law 
to life and submits it to a control ®ore severe than the discipline 
[which life] herself triposes."1* In this respect he seems to be a 
too-discriminatory fabulistj he demands too much. 
In reply to just this sort of judgment Janes hinself once wrote 
(in the preface to "the Lesson of the Master): What does this 
criticism imply, "but that we have been, nationally, so to speak, 
graced with no instance of recorded sensibility fine enough to react 
against these things fself-deception, vulgarity, hypocrisy]* what one 
would, accordingly fain to do," Janes says, is "to create the record, 
in default of any other enjoyment of it; to imagine, in a word, the 
honourable, the producible core, [italics mine] 
And this is what he has done. As F. R. Leavis puts it, James 
has created a world in which the sost highly developed faculties of 
discrimination could act* 'fie creates an ideal, civilized sensibility, 
a hunanity capable of conmaiicating the finest shades of inflect!cm 
§ The "destructive eleaent" concept is from Conrad's Lord Jin. 
10For all its intensity and inter-windings, a "watch-spring" 
kind of reality. 
*\j. w• Beach, The Method of iienry James (Philadelphia: Albert 
Saifer, 1954), lxxxvlii. "' ' """* " 
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12 and implication." He scorned the average, the representational, 
statistical kind of reality which was the concern of many of his 
contemporaries, 
In this regard, Olacknur, again, sayss 
James had in his style and peifeaps in his 
life which it reflected an idiosyncrasy so power­
ful, so overweening, that to many it seeded a 
stultifying vice, or at least an inexcusable heresy 
. • • lie enjoyed an excess of intelligence and he 
suffered, both in life and in art, from an excessive 
effort to comraunicate it, to represent it in all 
its fulness. His style grew elaborate in the degree 
that he rendered shades and refinements of meaning 
and feelings not usually rendered at all. . . His 
intention and all his labor was to represent 
dramatically intelligence at its most difficult, 
its most lucid, its most beautifbl point. This is 
the sua of his idiosyncrasy# 
Was Janes wrong to do this? And if so, or if not, what does 
it mean in terms of criticising hist? 
It nesns that if he did soaehow jack up reality, putting it 
on a higher plane than that froia which it is ordinarily approached, 
and demanded that the reader develop his sensibility to the point 
where he could enjoy art at this loftier level, then in order to 
criticise hia, the reader raust find a way to judge his on his own 
plane. As Janes himself says of Maupassant: "What he leaves out 
has not claim to get itself considered, till after we haw done 
R« Leavis, as quoted by J, W, Beach, The Question of 
Henry James, op, cit., xliii, 
1* 
R. P. lilackmur, as quoted by Morton D. Zabel, The Question 
of Henry James, op. cit., p. 21S, 
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justice to what he takes in."** 
8ut here is the rub, for James has declared in one of his 
stories, "Hie Figure in the Carpet," that his secret, the thing 
which he was most trying to communicate, will never he fathomed. 
In this puzzle story, the solving of which has been the concern of 
many of James's critics, James's master novelist, Vereker (whose 
critics aiss the thing he has written his books "most for"), says" 
Isn't there for every writer a particular 
thing of that sort, the tiling that most makes 
hin apply himself, the thing without the effort 
to achieve which he wouldn't write at all| the 
veiy passion of his passion, the part of the 
business in which, for hio, the flame of art bums 
most intensely? , » . There's an idea in my work 
without which I wouldn't give a straw for the 
whole job. It's the finest, fullest intention of 
the whole lot, and the application of it has been, 
I think, a triumph of patience and ingenuity, , . 
It stretehes, this little trick of mine, froa 
book to book. The order, the form, the texture of 
•y books will perhaps someday constitute for the 
uninitiated a complete reproduction of it. . • 
so it is naturally the thing for the critic to 
look for. . . It strikes me, . * even as the thing 
for the critic to find. 
This trick, or "exquisite theme," as Vereker calls it, we can 
be sure, is the same thing as Jaaes's "Figure in the Carpet," the 
"Turn of the Screw," the "Beast in the Jungle." This is the thing 
about James's works which »ystifies readers. And when put into 
practice James's trick is^the cause of what critics consider to be 
the ambiguity and moral confusion of his later works. 
This "Figure in the Carpet" has been variously defined: Vereker 
**The Future of the Novel, op, cit., p, 202 
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warns his critics that it is not a kind of esoteric message; and 
he will not liait it by saying it is something in the style or 
soesething in the thought—an element of for® or an elenient of 
feeling; but ha does says "What I contend that nobody has ever 
raentioned In say work is the organ of life." 
Actually, this secret of James is so simple that the reader 
would feel cheated, if James told him what it was, simply. Conrad aost 
certainly knew what the secret was, for he, too, employed it in 
all of his works; although, as James might have said: "Conrad does 
not reveal it in the style, but he captures it in the style." The 
"figure in the carpet" is sisply the fact that reality seems to be 
paradoxical} that, therefore, in order to capture reality, art nust 
likewise see® to be paradoxical. Or, to put it another way: every 
artist sets out to define reality as he sees it, and all artists 
have as their goal the development of sensibility; every artist 
assumes from the beginning that his reader is temporarily innocent 
of his particular view of truth, or reality—or, otherwise, why 
would he try to consunicate it? 
Eut to cormunicate it is to make the innocent aware; it is to 
corrupt hin, to destroy his innocence. This is the paradox of life 
and of art, and it is Henry James*® only thente. The world is truly 
a vicious round in which the innocent seek the knowledge of the 
non-innocent, and then, when (or if) they are corrupted (that is, 
if they do not retreat fro® this knowledge in time), then feed on 
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the unawareness of the innocent. This is the truth which James 
communicates; but it does not explain the means by which he himself 
manages to escape this vicious circle} for Jaaes—like no other 
writer other titan Joseph Conrad—insists upon himself remaining 
innocent—upon himself being neither corrupt, nor a corrupter, upon 
remaining, that is, uninvolved. 
The loophole by which Janes apparently thinks he escapes this 
vicious circle is his trick; his technique of circumlocution being 
the first key. James's truth that truth is paradoxical and illusory 
is so siiaple that it had to be circumlocuted to sees like any truth 
at all. 
A writer like Janes tsust sometimes circualocute the truth he 
is trying to portray just so that, in prose, it will not seem a 
cliche which the reader will think he already knows. The writer 
must sosae times recast un old truth in a new mold, so that what seems 
old will evoke the original response which the truth would evoke 
in any guise, if the guise itself were not so often false and un­
original. The writer isust proceed by indirection. 
A work of James's which illustrates the necessity of this 
technique more than others is the story, "The Beast in the Jungle," 
a work which depends entirely upon circumlocution and indireetion to 
communicate a simple idea which Jaaes might have revealed in a few 
lines, if he had really thought the idea could be so easily revealed. 
The story is of a nan, John Marcher (the na»e evokes his 
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action), who spends all of his lifetime waiting expectantly for 
something vitally remarkable to happen to him, sure, at every 
aoiaent, that something eventually will, since he has always sensed 
that he is being "kept" for a fate "rare and strange, possibly 
prodigious and terrible." He involves in his expectant waiting a 
woraan-fricnd, May iiartra», who, unbeknownst to his, loves him, and 
mo also lives for his strange fate to resolve itself. 
As it turns out, the remarkable thing that happens to John 
Marcher, finally, is the fact that nothing does—except for his 
remarkable involvement in expectation, lie does not even have the 
realization (in time for him to do anything about it, anyway) that 
his remarkable fate night have been to fall in love with expectantly 
waiting. May Sartram. For she, weanwhile, has died, after realizing, 
without telling Marcher so, that the strange fate that is to be his 
is never to shatter, in tine, the reaarkable paradox of his ambiguous 
expectation. 
If Jaaes had revealed the idea of this story in one line, the 
reader would have thought it too simple. Even as it is, his tendency 
is to pause, and say: "But, of course 1" Or: "But that's nothing 
remarkableI" And he tends to look askance and wonder if he hasn't 
been made a fool of. To which James would have no recourse, but to 
retort, sadly, like T. S. Eliot's Prufrocks "That is not what I 
meant at all; that is not it at all . . 
Because such a dreary response to paradox is not what Jaiaos 
meant! 
30 
Hie paradoxical, "trick" idea of the story is secondary to 
what Janes calls "the method at the heart of the madness"—the 
nethod at the heart of the sadness being the "organ of life," which 
James aanages to reflect by being able to embody a paradoxical idea 
in its own ambiguous substance, so much so that when the truth of 
the story is finally revealed for what it is, the reader is sur­
prised, not by the idea of paradox, which is not that remarkable, 
but by his substantiated involvement in paradox. The reader and 
Marcher thread their way through James's labyrinth together, arriv­
ing, after a duel predicament and after a duel kind of expectation 
at alnost a duel kind of realization—the realization that (despite 
anticipation) nothing remarkable has happened, except a reraarkahle 
involvement in anticipation. 
Janes has merely presented a vehicle, a paradoxical labyrinth 
for a mind to enter and depart from. What we have here is the 
mystery-detective story broadened and deepened to its fullest capacity, 
and then something besides. 
Obviously what James tried to do (but not do obviously) was 
to reawaken dulled and corrupted sensibilities to fresh responses 
again. That a man who has been condemned for his cold and overly-
controlled approach to life should have spent his lifetime proving 
the religious maxim that "lest you become as a child again, you 
will in no-wise re-enter heaven," is a paradox in itself. Janes 
plays the part of an innocent child, leading the reader through 
mysterious corridors and seemingly endless labyrinths, all for the 
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apparently naive purpose of springing forth suddenly with a truth 
which seems new only because it is old. There is always the 
response afterwards of: "But I already knew that!" Yet Jaaes will 
take this risk in order to open, or revitalize, deadened pores of 
perception. And he does it by the method of conscious indirection 
which gives an effect of new reality. 
Unconsciously indirect writing, on the otter hand—which we 
see in ®any of James's imitators—is often false and unoriginal 
because it does not peel away the issues which would penait the 
reader to face truth consciously; or, at least, to face the fact 
that he cannot know the truth. Indirection, like conscious ambiguity 
(as vlanres always employs it), should not be born of confusion. Ford 
Madox Ford, who bases his claim for Janes's greatness on James's 
gift as an historian, seeiss to display such confusion (about Jaaes's 
attitude towards circumlocution, if not about the use of the 
technique itself), when he says of Joaes: 
I fancy that his mannerisms, his involution, 
whether in speech or in writing were due to a 
settled conviction that [he would never] find any­
one who would not need talking down to. The 
desire of the artist ... is that his words and 
his scenes shall 'suggest* far more than they 
actually express or project." 
Ford addss "So he talked down to us . . . lie was aininp at 
explicitness, never obscurities, as if he were talking to children," 
iSFord Madox Ford, "Hie Old Man," essay in The Question of 
Henry Jaaes, op. cit., p. SI. 
32 
This statement, though very close, is still far off: it seetns 
to reveal unawareness of Jasaes's very conscious techniquo; for, if 
anything, Jases expected far store of his reader, not less. Jases 
didn't write down. Ford seems not to realize that the truth James 
was illustrating is really quite staple, bat it could not be 
coraaunicated simply; and Jawes was not conftised about it. To express 
it Janes had to be indirect and, apparently obtuse, just because it 
was so simple. Jaaes didn't doubt the discerning reader's ability 
to understand his truth, only the reader's willingness to admit, 
from the beginning, that he has temporarily forgotten it, and is in 
need of being reminded of what it is again. 
My adopting the method of conscious indirection Henry Janes, 
as a philosopher, is saying that truth is illusory; or, as T. 5. 
Eliot has Prufrock say its "It is a matter of decision and revi» 
sion." A aind that refuses to accept surface oeanings will always 
try to overturn the upper surface to see what lies beneath. A mind 
which embraces paradox insists that there is no surface which will 
defy this turning. It insists that every first impression is mi 
illusion. The world for such a mind is like two mirrors facing each 
other which reflect one another endlessly, except that the aind does 
not immediately see the entire succession of images. It does not 
see (as the mystic, for instance, maintains that he sees) how the 
infinite reflections of fact and symbol resolve themselves into a 
harmonious whole, an order that has meaning because everything in 
that order is equally significant. The mind which embraces paradox 
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moves fro® cm© image to another, examines it and then goes on to the 
next. Such a pursuit is paradoxical in itself, since it searches 
for meanin« with the presumption that meanings can never be found. 
It resigns to a paradoxical approach to life, and it decides that 
this image-breaking (or symbol-dissolving, since that is what images 
are: symbols of a manifestly incomprehensible reality) is the only 
\ 
meaningful pursuit there is. 
This, essentially, is tho kind of reality Janes wirrors (but 
not which he necessarily becomes involved in) —conscious indirection 
and ambiguity being his particular way of translating it into litera­
ture. 
The danger of this approach, of course, is that ambiguity and 
paradox are the language of irony, and irony-for-its-own-sake can 
be self-ccmsuaing and destructive of any meaning which it ostensibly 
intends to convey. It can end up taking nothing seriously, not even 
irony. It can beeosse, in other words, what Irving Babbitt (in his 
book Rousseau and Romanticism) has called"a pilgrioage in a void," 
Previously, Babbitt was quoted as saying that one of the most 
delicate tasks is to determine whether a paradox occupies a position 
111 
sore or less central than the convention to which it is opposed, . , 
lit 
Ambiguity and paradox are also the language of the mystic, 
but he uses thens in a quite different manner—as a compromise, a 
concession, to the demands of conventional reality; they are 
necessary to translate his vision into terms which can be understood, 
ilis vision, he o&intains, is beyond either paradox or ambiguity. 
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. . .  a n d  t h a t  a  s o a e w h a t  s i m i l a r  p r o b l e i a  i s  t o  
determine which of two conventions has the greater 
degree of centrality: for one convention may,_as 
compared to another sees highly paradoxical. 
And Schlegel says that romantic irony is identical with paradox, 
aabbitt is discussing here the complacency, almost fervor, with which 
the ronantic ironist (the Laforguian ironist, as Babbitt, ami Ivor 
Winters and Leslie Fiedler refer to him) is affilming the inevit­
ability of such an acceptance. 
James hiaself is not a romantic ironist—if oily because he 
takes himself and his art too seriously (The romantic-ironist, by 
definition, is often morbidly sensitive about hinself, but is 
always ready to mock at his own convictions)--hut James's brother, 
William, did notice the existence of a "void-like" irony-for-its-
own-sake attitude in James*s work, when he says that Janes*s 
characters see» constructed "wholly of prismatic interferences of 
light, ingeniously focused by mirrors upon empty space,*® 
This is the way the characters in many of James*s works do 
appear to be formed, and it accounts for the almost excessive 
ambiguity and the passionate curiosity, as well as for the apparent 
moral confusion, of some of his characters. 
Not only the external world seems to be "void-like," in this 
1̂ Babbitt, eg. cit, 
*®Andre Gide (from a letter to Charles Du Boi), The Question of 
nenry James, op, cit,, p. 251. 
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way, but also the people do, the characters themselves do, every­
thing does. As Andre Gide said: "James's characters never live 
except in relation to each other. And Gide stabs vitally close to 
what may be James's personal secret when he said that James "had no 
mystery in hi®, no secret, no 'Figure in the Qrpet' . . .  a s  i f  h e ,  
20 hiaself, had perhaps nothing to confess." 
Hiis appears to be true. It is the paradox of James, the person. 
In spite of his intense curiosity, his almost Morbid manner of hover­
ing about in the presence of aystery, he finally seems to indicate 
that there is no mystery at all in life, unless it is created. 
Reality has no substance for him. Reality is an image in the mirror; 
it exists only in the minds of people. 
Van Wyck Brooks said: 
Jaaes presented characters merely in the act of 
discovering one another [whose] ruling passion 
was curiosity. They tried to discover what went 
cm in cane another's sand and remained in the end 
as mystified as they were in the beginning . . . 
Everyone watched in Jaaes's novels, watched him­
self, watched the others, 'nosed about' for re­
lations, sniffed and pried, and the people were 
without consistence • • • they spun webs about 
themselves, and in fact they were ghosts without 
interests, or attributes, without passions, 
hearts or vitals; and they drifted about in a 
curious limbo as insubstantial as themselves. 
Brooks here, however, does not see® to realize how vulnerable he 
19Ibid.. p. 251. 2aIbid., p. 252. 
21Van Wyck Crooks, oj?. cit., p. 404. 
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is in his apparent invulnerability,22 does he seem to want to 
give Janes credit for controlled irony. James only portrayed the world 
as he saw it. His irony is his realization (and the display of 
that realization in his works) that this avid curiosity, which is 
so much a part of his characters, is nowhere mirrored more accurately 
than in the minds of his readers. For it is just this curiosity on 
the part of the reader that permits the author to draw the reader 
through the story. 
Jaaes's drama takes place largely in the winds of his characters, 
but he makes the reader erne of those characters. The characters and 
the reader are trying to thrust through illusion, and thus seem to 
be conducting the narrative as they do so. Jaaes presents his people 
almost without editorial comment; the characters and the reader sake 
all the conclusions that are to be made; and the reader cannot be 
sure what Jaaes himself really thinks, until he stands before hin 
at the conclusion of the story. And he sometimes can't tell even then. 
Jams lets the characters in his novels see the abyss that is 
between what they know and what they don't know, what they learn 
and what they never learn about one another. Hie realtor's degree 
of enlightensent (always limited, even at the conclusion) is always 
just greater than that possessed by the characters in the story. 
^Jm»s believed that the common denominator of behavior, 
which make3 mm raost human, is his tendency to fall into traps and 
be bewildered: nt'f fc have called the nost general state of one's 
most exposed and assaulted figures the state of bewildement. . .it 
is rather witless to talk of getting rid of that. . . highlyre-
commended . » , categories of feeling ... (Preface to The Princess 
Casaraissiiaa) 
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James penalts the reader then to grasp the immediate significance 
of the difference between what he knows and *Aat the character 
doesn't, but never so much that the reader will lose interest. 
Nothing is explained, hence the drama. This technique literally 
draw the reader within the story. As. R. P. Rlacteur says: "Hie 
secret of perception in the readers becomes very near the secret of 
23 creation in artists." 
None of James's stories so effectively illustrate his technique 
of indirection and circumlocution and the ambiguous depths through 
which an interpretive saind must delve in order to fathom the ironies 
and paradoxes possible with this technique than his story, "The 
Turn of the Screw," 
The central problem in interpieting this story—as it is in 
most of Jaraes's stories—is to determine which of the characters is 
seeing things as "they really are." When the reader has finished 
the story, he still can't be sure which character sees absolute 
truth; but if he has been diligent in always overturning the upper 
surface, he can finally disprove the veracity of at least sowe of 
the characters, and thus arrive closer to James's particular truth, 
and aaybe even truth as it is generally seen. The story is partic­
ularly treacherous, hoover; because the reader becomes so involved, 
finally, if he becmss involved at all, that James's final turn of 
23Blacknur, The Question of Henry James, op. cit., p. 215. 
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the screw may very well be at his expense. 
For nore than anything, "Us® Turn of the Screw" is a story 
about assumptions. It is a study of the lengths to which a delving 
Bind will go to interpret—falsely, if it wist—conditions and 
events which ©re not, literally, as the mind desires thee to be. 
Such a mind starts confusing its own desires for reality. Such a 
Blind begins to aisiuteipret the "literal" facts* It begins to 
misrepresent the "particulars" which are, themselves, anomalous. 
CHAPTER III 
THE ANOMALOUS PARTICULAR CASE 
Careless readers of "The Turn of the Screw" assume that this is 
a story about a governess's valiant attempts to keep two apparently 
innocent children fron the corrupting influence of two malevolent 
ghosts. More careful readers (viz, Edmund Wilson) have corrected 
this initial assumption, and have discovered that the story is 
actually an ambiguous tale which can be read in contrary ways. One 
way, as just indicated, is to assume the innocence of the guardian, 
to discover, subsequently, the corruption of the apparently innocent 
children. 
The other interpretation, sore accurate, is to reverse this view 
and recognize the governess as the corrupting influence. The latter 
approach, which takes into consideration the story's ambiguity, is 
certainly much eloser to the facts of the storyj but this interpreta­
tion, if it rests only at general a»biguity (unconscious ambiguity), 
as Edward Wilson's reading seems to do, is also misleading, because 
it does not give Jantes• s full credit for conscious irony, for what­
ever distance is implied by such ironyj and because it implies that 
there is no transcendent meaning to the aabiguous presentation. Un­
conscious ambiguity leaves one in illusion, instead of bringing one, 
temporarily, out of illusion; and it does not cause one to realise 
that involvement in illusion is sometimes the only reality there is. 
Involvement in illusion, the attempt to interpret it, can create 
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a new kind of reality, but it can also create illusion, too. Mo 
illusion develops, unless the Bind interprets particulars mysteriously, 
unless it extends to cold, hard actuality, soeie mystical quality. 
Reality, Jases would say, is not just the fact or the object, or even 
the "psychological picture" by which one gives the fact visual em­
bodiment; reality is also a person's involvement or lack of involve-
aent with the fact. If he does not become involved, he is mysterious 
in his lack of involvement. 
That is, reality is also the personal extensions of the cold, 
hard, "crystaline" detail—the generalities a person makes or does 
not sake about them. This act of discrimination, or failure to 
discriminate, is what constitutes reality. This is the "real thing," 
the "beast in the jungle,""the jolly corner," the "figure in the 
carpet," the "turn of tlie screw," the holy or unholy labyrinth. 
Wiat delusion consists of, James implies, is a person's refusal 
to recognize the part played by his involveaent or lack of involvement 
in illusion—the influence it has on his personal make-up, his 
personal "picture." It is just the refusal of this recognition, 
•lams would say, which permits a person (like the governess in "Hie 
Turn of the Screw," for instance) to become so involved in literary 
illusion, in the first place.1 He can fool himself into thinking he 
is getting experience, the facts, but is not, thereby, personally 
affected by them. S!e can have his cake and eat it, too} or, as the 
*The governess, of cour$@« does not herself become involved in 
literary illusion, but in the illusions which come from misrepre­
sentingconcrete "particulars." 
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case Bay be, he can take his poison and yet not take it, either. 
He cart live vicariously, share doubtful knowledge or overwhelming 
experience, and yet fool himself into thinking he is not really a 
part of it, lie can presume to innocence or ignorance, at the same 
time that he is losing it. He can feel insulated and inviolable, 
because of the multitudinous screens of illusion and delusion which 
aii ingenious artist like James raises between him and the cold fact. 
And what protects the reader, Jases would say—the innocence which 
permits hin to play this diabolical gase and yet, despite involve* 
merit, maintain his moral and intellectual solvency, is his naive 
belief that the fictional fact is not real—when, James would insist, 
it is as real or more real than life itself, which has no aeaning 
at all until it is strained through a person's consciousness. He 
says, in other words, that this relationship to the fact or illusion 
is reality. "Tell me of what the artist or reader or character is 
conscious," James says, "and I will tell you what he is." He night 
as well have said: "Tell ne what he is, and X will tell you what he 
sees." 
If the careful reader sticks close to the text of "The Turn of 
the Screw" (and this is, except for the rebounding critical opinion, 
all he has to go cm, except for one or two illuminating com@nts about 
the story by James},2 he will see that this particular illusion is 
ambiguous, not because the reader cannot determine who is genuine— 
the children or the governess. (There is actually nothing ambiguous 
2 These comments to be brought forth later. 
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about Jases's attitude towards her.) Evidence is readily available 
of how sho perverts truth for her own motives (and thoy my, as 
Edmund Wilson indicates, be Freudian actives) . . , The apparent 
contradiction in the story is that this "reporter," who distorts 
reality, is also, as Janes says, "the authority." The governess 
(she who is the one most in illusion) is also the "governor" of the 
"literary" illusion. She holds "crystaline" in her consciousness 
"her record of so many anomalies said obscurities" in the life around 
her* That is, she perfectly and impartially reflects all of the 
facts to the reader; but in her involvement with the facts, her 
explanation of the facts, she tends to Misrepresent each of them.5 
Therefore, the reader himself aust carefully delve beneath her mis­
representations to unearth the truth which exists, despite her mis­
representation, within the "crystaline" view. As Jases says, we 
need not accept the governess's explanation of the anomalies, for 
that is "a different matter.^ 
The final interpretation is left to the reader's discretion—and 
this is fortunate or unfortunate, according to the reader's tempera­
ment—and potentially ironical, too, in the end, because it can lead 
the reader into the sarae illusions the gov©mess faces, and also 
3The governess, in other words, imitates the facts perfectly, 
in nuch the same way, the naturalists, for instance, imitate life; 
but then she distorts them, 
*!!cnry Jaaes, as quoted in "Henry James to the Ruminant Reader: 
Hie Turn of the Screw." fay Edna Kenton. A Casebook on Henry Jams's 
TKeT^^tKe Served.) Gerald Nillen (Mew Vorkr^SSas Y. <Wll 
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provide hiss th© saw® opportunities for aisrepre sen tat i on. But if 
tit® reader is truly discriminating he can, at least, @liaiaate th® 
governess as an accurate reporter of experience. 
This last point needs careful documentation because, despite 
th© critical attention this work has received, it is a fact not 
enough emphasi 2®d. Also the clear light the story casts upon mm*n 
<reneral ititlimttion to fall into and out of illus-iea, because either 
he m reality is ambiguous or paradoxical, is also pertinent to the 
thesis at hand. Edaund Wilson, for instance, recognizes the m-
bipwity of the sfwemess's response to Illusion, and he catalogues 
his £i»diitg»| but he concludes that this reading is only one of th# 
possible interpretations regarding her. He i»j»liea that Jamas, not 
necessarily th# pjoveraess, is obscure*, and that ho is obscure purely 
for the sake of romance, for the sake of illusion. 
fin th© contrary, there is nothing obscure about th® governess's 
assumptions; she quit# obviously distorts reality; and although James 
is ambiguous, he is not ambiguous purely for the sake of illusion* 
for romance. He is purposely ambiguous for the sake of iavolyeaent, 
for the act of discrimination such a presentation forces in the 
consciousness of the critical reader; in other words, for the "higher 
reality** such a presentation achieves by not presuming to be real, 
yet by presenting at the same time, a real condition of humanity— 
that is span's tendency to fall into traps and he bewildered. 
* * * 
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The governess in "The Turn of the Screw" is a wmm dreadfully 
liable to impression, who atlraits that she is "easily carried away." 
"I mm carried away in London," she tells Mrs. Grose, the house-
keeper, referring to her infatuation with her male employer-~an 
infatuation whicft influences many of her acts and decisions, Sent 
to Ely, an isolated estate, where she finds herself "strangely" at the 
hela," in "suprerae authority," sent there to educate the young niece 
of her ©a^loyer, she is jbuaediatftljr suspicious. At once, she suspects 
that the housekeeper, Mr*#- Grese# is on her guard about greeting her 
fully, although actually the governess*s first reaction is pleasure 
at being greeted so volubly. In a typical way she has of presenting 
the true detail, and then distorting that detail, she says: "I 
perceived within half an hour that she was so glad * , * as to be 
positively on her guard against showing it too such* I wondered even 
then * , * why she would wish- not to show it, and that* with r»« 
flection, with suspicion, aight of coirse have me uneasy,"5 
IMs quote shows how Janes gives the reader a "crystaline" view 
of events at Mly by working through the wind of a person whom the 
reader, eventually, has all the reason to raistrust. One such insight 
isakes her seen reasonable and self-aw are, but as such impressions 
multiply, the sensitivity of the governess becomes suspect* we begin 
to suspect her of being overly acute. 
C 
Quotes £r« The Turn of the Screw from A Casebook en Henry 
James's pirn of the Screw,, op. jl"t»t which includes a prxitting of 
'tKe e«pTef@ TtoryT 
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This first "turn of the screw" is particularly ironical, too, 
because for the reader to be so acute as to begin to suspect the 
governess of being overly acute is very similar to the governess's 
beginning to suspect the housekeeper, Mrs* Grose, of being the sane. 
the governess's fears are evaporated when she meets Flora, the 
niece, who is "beatific" and "angelic," although these adjectives 
spur the reader into making soma aore assumptions of his own. One 
sore twist of the screw, now, makes hi# suspect Floral another twist, 
later, will make hia suspect, even aore, the woman who uses such 
adjectives, 
the governess looks forward to her duty, which is to "watch, 
teach, form"6 the child, and she arranges that she should have Flora 
"as a matter of course at night." She feels that one of her duties 
is to "contrive to win the child into a sense of knowing" her. 
On discovering that little Miles, the nephew of her employer, 
has "dismissed his school"—an event always open to suspicion be­
cause the contents of the letter from the school are never divulged, 
and, as Mrs, Grose later explains, "no particulars given"—the 
governess tells Mrs. Grose that Miles "is an injury to the others," 
and "to aeet [her] friend the better," she "offers up on the spot" 
the sarcastic reply that Miles is an injury to "his innocent mates," 
an ironic twist at the expense of Miles*s schoolmates (an assumption 
6In its innocent sense, "to watch, teach, form" is also the 
duty of the classicist. 
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that Mrs. Grose appreciates "seating" another nind as suspicious 
as her mm) that the governess will later use in reference to her 
own pupils. 
The governess "fancies" that Mrs. Grose seeks to avoid her. 
She involves Mrs. Grose in talk about Miles, and she wonders aloud 
if he mightn't be a "contaminating" influence. In response to this 
conjecture, Mrs, Grose laughs "oddly"! "Are you afraid he*11 
corrupt youT* she says, a question which gives the governess "an 
apprehension of ridicule." 
Her "apprehension", of course, could be correct, but she does 
not try to find out on what grounds it is correct; that is, whether 
or not the "ridicule" is justified. 
The following day the governess enquires about the forser 
governess, discovers that she was pretty, and says? ""He seeas to 
like us young and pretty"—referring, probably, to her eraployer, 
but, possibly, to Miles. Mrs. Grose replies: "Oh, he did," a 
use of the past tense which is glossed over by Mrs. Grose, and which 
breeds the first suspicion in the governess's siind that there was 
possibly, at one time, another male or female at Bly. 
Hiles cones down to Bly, already under "an interdict," as the 
governess phrases it, and, like Flora, he is all innocence with a 
"fragrance of purity," "divine," "incredibly beautiful." She decides 
to do nothing at present about the school letter concerning his 
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"dismissal," and, when she tells Mrs. Grose of this decision, she 
immediately assumes that Mrs, Grose1s flicking of her apron and her 
opening comment: "Miss, if I may use the freedosa , , are an 
overture to kissing her, which she permits—fee ling then that she 
and Mrs, Grose are at one. Actually Mrs, Grose's flicking of her 
apron could be an overture to giving a hesitant reprimand or merely 
refusing to become involved in the Governess's assumptions. 
• * * 
To digress a noment: here—in just the "flicking of an apron" 
by a housekeeper, an action which is construed by another person 
as an overture to "oneness," as the forming of a "pact" of sorts, 
we have a"crystaline, anomalous, particular ease," which as James 
would say is "adorably pictoral." Hie action is simple enough, 
yet it is so simple that various interpretations can be put upon 
it. 
To Jaiaes's unique consciousness, "particulars"—physical, 
psychological, objective, subjective, ruminative entities—are all 
"adorably pictoral,"8 since they can be strained through the picture-
receiving consciousness's of his "reporters," and can even be 
distorted by thm in their own minds, Sut in themselves the 
7 
The actual word is "dismissed"; "he has dismissed his school"— 
which leaves it open to two interpretations; either M'ies did the 
"dismissing" or he was "diSBissed," We can't know which. 
8Ja®es, "Hie Art of Fiction," Hie Future of the Novel, op. cit., 
p. 23. —. — — • 
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"particulars" are anomalous in their ambiguity; they perversely deny, 
in themselves, to be anything more than "adorably pictoral." If 
they are misleading, the v. is representation reflects only the mis­
leading Binds of those who interpret them. The particulars themselves 
are all ambiguous anomalies. 
According to this logic, even a human being, a Jamesian "reporter," 
can be a "crystaline, anomalous, particular case." It is possible for 
the Jasesiait reporter to hold "crystaline" in his consciousness "the 
record of the many anomalies and obscurities of life arowtd him"; 
he can, in other words, act as a "common denominator" of experience 
and mirror exactly what he sees, and yet still reflect back 
associations which are innacurate, simply because of the anomaly 
of the particular case; that is, the propensity for ambiguous in­
terpretation always inherent in every fact—whether the fact be a 
psychological "picture," emanating frosa a physical object (the way a 
wonan stands thus and gracefully lays her gloves upon a table), 
whether it is a person, or whether it is a concrete object. 
For Jaiaes the particular case is always the general case, too; 
it is at every taoaent the nicrocosra and the macrocosm; it is, at 
every aoraent, like a Chinese puzzle, a set of interfittin.y Japanese 
tables, a conbination of reflecting mirrors—all of which could be 
infinite in their potential combinations and intervorkings, if the 
artist could (or wanted to) wake thea so. Eut this magical power 
of the particular case is temporarily shattered when a "reporter*s 
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consciousness begins working on it. 
The "reporter*®" consciousness, in other words, reacts innately 
to the remarkable ambiguity of the particular case by either culling 
fro® it meanings which are, in some cases, absolutely unique (unique, 
that is, in being a "common denominator" of experience); or, in other 
cases by taking fros it meanings which are absolutely peculiar 
(peculiar, that is, in not being any longer a "coramon denominator" 
of experience. Or else the "reporter's" consciousness robs the 
particular of any extensions beyond itself at all, and remains flatly 
imitative. 
Thus, it is not the experience of misrepresenting or isae.nifyinr 
or underestimating a fact which is uncosaaon (the general condition 
of humanity, James says, is to "fall into traps and be bewildered). 
It is the "reporter*s" reaction to that very coaaon experience of 
becoming involved with and shattering the ambiguity of the anomalous 
particular case which is potentially explosive.*® By temporarily 
a 
Hie classicist—who insists upon refracting some meaning frora 
particulars, if only the act of creating seaning from the®, would 
look upon the temporary shattering as good and necessary, in order 
to gain soae higher meaning. The story teller, the romantic, would 
also look upon it as fortunate and necessary, in order, as Jases 
says of romance, to "cut the stxkig" on the "real" properties of the 
particular case. The historian, who insists upon aerely reflecting, 
imitating particulars, and insists upon letting the particulars 
speak entirely for themselves, would call this temporary shattering 
of "reality," and the subsequent "romanticizing" of the fact, bad. 
10 
One can't help associating the "particular case," in this 
sense, with the temporarily "shattered" atom, and man's reaction to 
that act. 
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shattering its inherent ambiguity, th® reader makes it temporarily 
something unique for himself (which is all a classicist would ask); 
but if, in the process of reacting to his unique experience, the 
"reporter*1 makes the case so supremely peculiar to himself that it 
no longer shares bed-or-board with general experience,1* then it is 
no longer humanly relevant, and it is not only paradoxical, but 
distructive of any meaning which it ostensibly seeks to convey, 
If this discussion seems to be irrelevant to any pursuit except 
the classical (which priaarily maintains an interest in meaning), it 
is very relevant to that pursuit; because the unique attitude of the 
classicist is that he isust innately suspect (though aay use) a 
peculiar, an eccentric experience. "Humanity," he says (as before 
quoted), "is what uen have in common with each other, and not what 
they have in distinction," "Art is selection, and it is selection 
whose aain care is to be typical, to be inclusive." "The essence 
of moral energy is to survey the whole field." 
This demand on the particular case to remain "crystaline" (that 
is, to reflect accurately the "anomalies and obscurities of life"), 
yet be, at the same time, a unique reflection of life—whether the 
particular case is an objective fact, or a "picture" of a person 
11 "This discussion, though admittedly very abstract, at this 
point in the thesis, is pertinent not only to the classical stance, 
but to the "mystic" stance as well, which will be discussed briefly, 
as it applies to Jaraes, in the last section of the thesis. 
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looking at m objective fact*2 this demand tends, because of the 
various interpretations of it which are possible, to extend life's 
reflections, life's "pictures" indefinitely, so that in James's 
style (quoting Slaeksur's description again —which is itself a 
reproduction of this plasticity of life in general): "The secret 
of perception in the reader cones very near the secret of creation 
in the artist." 
This is probably why James refers to the novel as "history": 
"As the picture is reality," he says, "so the novel is history"*^ 
an apparent confusion of terms which aakes us want to ask of James: 
"if the novel is history, then what is history?—until we realize 
that, to Jesses, history undoubtably resembles fiction, because it 
more visibly, aore "pictorally," partakes of the general hUBsan 
condition—which is the liability to fall into traps and be be­
wildered." History adhers to the particulars; it doesn't usually 
presuae to take in the whole picture at once but plods along, 
apparently fully occupied, at each moment, in the mystique of each 
12 
Hie governess in "Hie Turn of the Screw"—she who "governs" 
the illusions in this story—is all three: an objective fact, a 
"crystalin© consciousness," and also a "picture" (Jams's illusion) 
of someone looking at objective facts; arid, therefore, is herself 
an "anomalous particular case." 
13 
The Future of the Novel, op, cite» p. 5. 
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fact.14 
Such fact-for-fact, "chronicled" history, however, is not art, 
James would say, until a creative consciousness stands back and 
views it objectively; and then strains it back into literature 
through a sensitising, fact-for-fact, "picturizing" hunan conscious­
ness (which saay or say not be objective)--leaving it, still, the 
fluid, anomalous, complex tiling life appears already to be—yet, in 
14 
In itself, of course, there is nothing indefensible about 
looking at on® tiling at a time. The. mystic, for instance, who 
assiases that he gets beyond even irony and paradox (though he must 
use paradox to translate his vision), always looks at one thing at 
a tiiae, absorbed totally in the raystery of each. But he expects 
(unlike the supreme ironist) to find s one thing of absolute value 
thereby, tie professes to having hnd a realization that everything 
whcih exists is always, at every ncnent, soaehow a part of everything 
else. To the cystic nothing is rcore significant than anything else, 
and yet, conversely, nothing is less significant than anything else, 
either. 
This equation is not even, necessarily, an affirmation, but 
simply a statement of fact* If me desires to examine the idea, 
it can wean (as Ingmar Berpian develops it in his movie "Through 
a Glass Darkly") that God is a Spider—and mean, thereby, nothing 
necessarily derogatory to the spider, or to the concept of God, 
either, for that matter. Hie significance of the idea depends upon 
the peculiar or general way a human being has of looking at a fact. 
If such a comparison tens to nudge one into a state of madness (as 
it does the young girl in Bergman*s movie), this is possibly because 
one gives the spider, or the concept of God, more significance, 
mere "presence," more "reality," than one should* 
The matter-of-fact anomalous "logic" of this "r.ystic's" equation 
is that "nothinjr is sore significant than anything else, yet nothing 
is less significant than anything else, cither. This is a cosnsieally 
democratic idea which is not likely to catch on generally—or at 
least until the human consciousness stops magnifying things ("parti­
culars") out of perspective with one another. It's an idea which 
James himself, who is hardly democratic, would probably look at 
askance, had he been interested in "ideas." 
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the meantime, Baking a cos;isaent on life and involving the reader hi*-
IS self in a conscious or unconscious cos«*ent on life, too. That is, 
discriminating, classical art "human.iass," in the foro of fiction, 
"hi story" or "life" which lias "no direct sense whatever for the 
subject," and refracts it into the stuff of a greater complexity. 
Jane:# view of life was, thus, one of costalc fluidity, a continuous 
organic transformation sad re transformation, in which the artist played 
But as T, S, Eliot said of Jataes*$ "baffling" escape frorc this 
sphere of interests "James had a mind so fine that no idea could 
violate it," Jaaes was interested in the seans of capturing life most 
fully, not in the ends. If anything, he doubted Ms breadth of (though 
not his passion for)' Idctail. lie evidently felt he had never fully 
explored the full possibilities of "the particular case." He admires 
Balzac most, for example, for having almost lost himself in a 
labyrinth of detail (an envy which would seen' contrary to his 
suspicion of the naturalistic writers, like Sola, who do lost them­
selves, except that Jams would say that Balzac wore $TTly realized 
the:.! artistically). Jaaxs says of Balzac: 1 
. . . Cur passages are mainly short and dark . . . we 
soon cose to the end of the??!—dead walls, dead walls, 
without resonance, in presence of which the candle goes 
out and the gam stops, and we have only to retrace our 
steps. Balzac*s luxury, as I call it, was in the 
extraordinary number and length of his radiating and 
ramifying corridors—the labyrinth in which he finally 
lost hissefl . . .It is a question, you see, of penetrat­
ing into a sbject; his corridors always went further and 
further; which is but another way of expressing his 
inordinate passion for detail ... (from the Lesson on 
Balzac) 
IS 
"Conscious or unconscious" according to their temperament and 
habits of discrimination. 
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a role, not only of Moderator, but of creator.To borrow Leon 
iidel's phrase: the artist is one "who gives a permanent and endur­
ing shape to a life which is evanescent and perishable."*'' Or, as 
Jams himself says in the preface to The Spoils of Ponyton; 
. . . lif© being all inclusion and confusion, 
and art being all discrimination and selection, 
the latter, in search of the hard latent value, 
with which alone it is concerned, sniffs around 
the mass as instinctively and unerringly as a 
dog suspicious of sosae buried bone. The dif­
ference here, however, is that while the dog 
desires his bone but to destroy it, the artist 
finds in his tiny nugget, washed free of awkward 
accretions and hararaered into a sacred hardness, 
the very stuff for a clean affinaation, the 
happiest chance for the indestructible.*8 
The artist can refine his "tiny nugget" of value, of meaning, 
from the awkward accretions of life, but he does not, thereby, 
necessarily know life, or shatter its ambiguous laysteryj he simply 
holds the "happiest chance for the indestructible." 
Thus, he is always involved in the question—"endlessly baffling 
indeed—of the raethod at the heart of the sadness"* that is, where 
to find these affiraative "nuggets" and how to recognize thea when they 
are found. And, as we have already said, James finds them always 
16The artistic alchemist does not want only a symbolical 
approximation of reality, but reality itself, not ̂ old alone, but 
the ability to re-create gold on his own. He wants to knew the full 
taystery of creation itself* 
17 Leon Edel (ed.), The Future of the Novel, op. cit., p. xv, 
18 , 
Ibid., p. 52. 
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"ia the logic of the particular ease": 
If life, presenting us the germ and left 
merely to herself in such a business, gives the 
case away, almost always before we can stop her, 
what are the signs for our guidance, what the 
priraary laws for a saving selection, how do we 
know when and where to intervene, where do we place 
the beginnings of the wrong and the right deviation? 
Such would he the elements of an inquiry upon which, 
I hasten to say, it is quite forbidden ne here to 
embark. I but glance at them in evidence of the rich 
pasture that at every turn surrounds the rurainant 
critic. The answer say be after ail that mysteries 
elude us, that general considerations fail or mis­
lead, Mid 'that eyeb the fondest of artists ne*e<l ask 
no wider range tk'an* tKe logic' ofTKe 'partlc'tflar 
case tallies ain'ef'".'^' 
It is as though Jams were saying that life evades no one less 
than it does the artist who wants to capture it whole; yet it 
evades no one more than the artist if he does not go at it piece-
This admittedly is a complex artistic approach, despite the 
apparent simplicity of the particular ease; but, then, complex Binds 
demand complex illusions, and, conversely, complex illusions require 
complex minds to interpret the®, Janes provides both in his works 
by concentrating on the "particular case," which, in its "crystaline" 
ability to reflect accurately the anomalies and obscurities of life, 
seems to be no less rebounding and eliptical in its ambiguities and 
mysteries than life appears to be. 
In the process, what he creates is "the organ of life"—-the 
19Ibid., p. 52. 
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Hystericus entity his fictional novelist, Vereker, in the story, 
"Hie Figure in the Carpet/' said no on® had ever fathomed in his 
works, but which it seemed to Vereker (and, ao doubt, to James him­
self) he should search for. 
No one, of course, could ever fathom the "Organ of Life"; be­
cause, although he sight discover what Jaaes's "Figure in the Carpet" 
is, he would never know, in any literal way, what the "Figure in the 
Carpet" reflected. Hie "Figure in the Carpet" is the Jamesian, 
convoluted, apparently ambiguous technique, by which he tries to 
represent life. It is the artistic aeons by which he tries to re­
create life, by involving his readers in what h© called "the abyss 
of ambiguity," the "rein of the great a®biguity," the "huaan lia­
bility to fall into traps and be bewildered." 
In other words, it is James's attempt to involve his readers 
in the immense "Organ of Life" itself—which is life's illusory 
reality, its mystery, or, if not life's mystery, then in man's 
paradoxical predilection to assuae that lif© is mysterious and 
illusive, and—like the governess in "The Turn of the Screw"—to 
throw himself passionately into it. 
* * * 
"Hi© governess, herself, feels this ambiguous lusaaa response to 
mystery, when, after permitting Mrs. Grose, the housekeeper to kiss 
her and seal (what she presumes to be) a "oneness" between the®, 
she muses at length on her position at Bly and feels that it is 
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"fin©"—but "perhaps £ trap, not designed, but deep---to 
delicacy, perhaps to [her] vanity; whatever in fher] was most 
excitable." (italics mine) Later she is to look back cm the ©vents 
which follow this musing as a "change ... like tne spring of a 
beast," Sut at the moment she ©uses on her own "discretion," her 
"quiet good sense," and her "general high propriety"; she feels 
tranquil and justified"; and she has the faith that these merits 
will "publicly appear" in tine. 
The governess's raising turns toward ronance and toward the hope 
of raeetinj* someone who would "stand before her and smile and approve." 
Almost immediately, her "ioagination turn fs] real," (italics mine) 
and at that very soment she sees a ghost upon the battlements who 
is "not the person [she} had precipitatedly supposed (not, that is, 
her employer, as Edmund Wilson surmises),20 
The ghost stands there "wearing no hat." Later she finds herself 
hesitant to mention her discovery to Mrs. Grose, although she ration­
alizes her notive as an "instinct of sparing her coapanion." Tne 
shock of her meeting with the ghost has "sharpened all [her] sense," 
Mid she feels Bly has been "subject to an intrusion." 
Hie ghost, of course, is obviously, the governess's wild 
"imagination turned real"; she is beginning to confuse her desires 
for reality, and is asking (at least for herself) "reality" of her 
desires; that is, "reality" of her involvement with mysterious 
20 Henry Jawes, Casebook, op. cit. 
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particulars, which, themselves, have been no taore ambiguous than 
"psychological particulars"—that is, a few random remarks dropped 
by Mrs, Grose, a gesture or two, misconstrued. 
A few days later the governess sees the same ghost again, 
staring in through the dining room window, "a forward stride in 
[their] intercourse," and she feels she has been "looking at him 
for years and had known his always"; and, furthermore, she surmises 
from the ghost's diverted stare that he actually carae there "for 
someone else*" 
She dashes around, "out of duty*1 to confront the ghost, finds 
him gone, but feels that he "was there or was not there; not there 
if [she] ditto't see hiia." (italics sine) 
Mrs, Grose comes upon the scene, and the governess immediately 
places herself in the same spot where the ghost had stood, and whan 
Mrs. Grose responds to her presence there in the saae way she her­
self had responded to the presence of the ghost, the governess 
wonders why Mrs. Grose "should be scared." This wonder immediately 
turns to positive conviction in her raind that she no longer "needs 
to respect the bloom of Mrs. Grose"j and she now has a feeling that 
she "must share" her knowledge with the housekeeper, 
* * * 
In regard to this urge to "share" diabolical knowledge, it 
should be remeabered (digressing again, for a moment) that in the 
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preamble to the reading of Douglas's handwritten tale about the 
governess, when the guests, in the ho»e where Douglas is staying, 
have finally convinced hie to read his old nanuscript, and are 
grouped about his for the hearing, the odd tale which calls this 
story to Douglas's wind is one told by another guest, about a snail 
boy who had seen a ghost and who had awakened his mother, "not to 
dissipate his dread Mid soothe hist to sleep again, hut to encounter 
also, herself, before she had succeeded in [quieting his fears], the 
sane sight that had shaken his," 
Hie diabolic innocence of the boy is what is interesting, and 
relevant. 
Also interesting and relevant—although the relevance will not 
immediately sees clear— is the coincidence that Douglas, the 
narrator of this story [the "envelope narrator" once removed from 
the Jamesian "envelope narrator" who is telling the story to us] was 
himself, like Miles, once under the influence of this same governess, 
when he confronted her at his family's estate (the name of which is 
not given), "on erasing down the second suBttaer" from Trinity. He was, 
at the time, tan years her junior; and like Miles he also had a 
sister under her tutelage, ; 
./ 
When Douglas is quizzed by one of his listeners about who® it 
was the governess was in love with, Douglas is able to evade the 
question, which he apparently finds too acute, or too disruptive, 
when the Jaaesian "envelope narrator" quickly answers for hira by 
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saying: "Time will tell"—to which evasion, Mrs, Griffin, one of 
the listeners, says: "Well, if I don't know who she was in love 
with, I know who he was." 
Mrs« Griffen, of course, is referring to Douglas, who has al­
ready said of the governess: "She was a sost charming person, but 
she was ten years older than I. She was ay sister*s governess." 
Now, it would be interesting, aid one more diabolical turn-of-
tho-screw- in this story (that is, on® aor© example of the "stretch­
ing power*1 of Janes*s anomalous particular case), if it could be 
proved that Miles and Douglas were me and the same person (there is 
no proof that Miles died at the end of the story, only that the 
governess felt his heart stop). iiy this reading, Mrs. Griffen's 
remarks "I know who he was," could vaean, not who Douglas was in love 
with, but literally who he was (his identity)f And to examine so 
Eiinutely such an innocent grouping of words is doing no wore than 
J«$es*s expects, because he himself obviously left many such phrases 
purposely open to aabiguous interpretations—particularly in his use 
of pronouns. It is sometimes impossible to tell, simply by the group­
ing of James's pronouns, who is saying what to whoa. 
Douglas denies that the initial experience was his ownj but, 
actually, the initial involvement; that is, the governess's viewing 
of her experience was not Douglas's Involvement, either. It was 
peculiarly the governess's. Douglas says that he took down nothing 
but the "impress ion." "I took that lie re," Douglas says, very 
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significantly tapping his heart, "I've never lost it." 
Jaaes's "envelope narrator" is the next to ask the question: 
"was the governess in love?" to which Douglas replies: "You are 
acute. Yes, she was in love. That is, she had been. That case 
out—she couldn't tell her story without its coming out, I saw it 
and she saw it; but neither of us spoke of it," 
And then Douglas almost negates this kind of speculation entirely, 
by saying: "I xcraeaber the time and the place—the comer of the 
lawn, the shade of the great beaches and the long, hot summer after­
noon," 
Most of Miles's important encounters with the governess are at 
night in his rooa, or, at least, inside the house—except for one; 
and that is his talk with her outside tho church, just before sho 
flees hone in confusion, after he and she startle one another with 
their awareness of the other's perceptiveness. 
It would be impossible to prove this point, that Douglas and 
Miles are one and the saae person; and perhaps not even profitable; 
but it would be on© sore tum-of-the-screw, one sore exaaple of wan's 
"precious liability to fall into traps and be bemrildered," which is 
one of Jaaes's chief demands upon a story, since it can only "thicken" 
or "size u|>" the story. 
These various interpretations, James says, "stiffen the whole 
texture"; 
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The apparitions » , . are matters as to which 
in themselves, really, the critical challenge 
(essentially nothing ever but the spirit of fine 
attention) may take a hundred forms—and a 
hundred felt or possibly proved infirmities is too 
great a nusaber. (Mir friends' respective minds 
about they, on the' 'other kand,~are ai different 
aatter^clialTenge'able, and repeated?)', you'like, 
but never challengeable without some consequent 
farther stiffening o£ the whole texture. (italics 
nine)" k 
Jaaes is probably as consciously anbiguous about Douglas's true 
relationship to the governess as he is about Miles's and the govern­
ess's relationship. If nothing else, as just indicated, it creates 
tension; but James seems to be giving us clues by his reference to 
years in the introduction. The governess was ten years older than 
Douglas; she had died twenty years before Douglas's telling of the 
story to the houseguests; it had been forty years since Douglas was 
told the story by the governess. 
But the reader doesn't know how old Douglas was when he caste 
down fro® Trinity, lias he ten (like Miles), or a young nan? And we 
don't know how old the governess was when she told Douglas her story 
(only that she was ten years older than he), or how old Douglas is 
at his tailing of the story to his guests, except that she was evident­
ly young enough to stir love in his heart when he was a boy, and he 
is agile enough, when telling his story to the houseguests, to be 
kicking logs in the fire. 
2*The Future of the Movel, op. cit., p. 67. 
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Whether Miles and Douglas are, in fact, one, or not, the saae 
effect is achieved, nevertheless, Douglas is just one sore "ghost" 
in the long chain of possible misrepresentors of simple fact in this 
story. Just as the governess steps into the shoes of Quint, in order 
to frighten Mrs. Grose, Douglas (possibly Miles) next steps into the 
shoes of the governess by reading her story to his listeners, anions; 
who® is tli© Jasnesian "envelope narrator," who relates it to us. 
The ironic twist of this dosino-like succession, or concentric 
ring, or elipticai series of stories-within-stories is that the 
corrupting (or educating) involved is always undertaken out of a 
sense of duty or love. Douglas tells his listeners that the governess 
would not have told him the story about the ghosts, if she hadn't 
liked him; and, ostensibly, Douglas and the "envelopenarrator": 
[James] tell their listeners [us] the tale for the same reason. 
Under the guise of mere story telling, what is obviously felt to be 
soaehow diabolical, is imparted, on the pretense of duty, or love, 
or liking. 
This presence of moral ambiguity is the reason for the repeated 
question in the introduction: "Who does the governess love?" Douglas 
says that the story won't tell, "not in any literal, vulgar way"; 
and when he is first asked if the story is "beyond everything," as 
he described it, "for sheer terror?" the Jaiaesian "envelope narrator" 
feels that Douglas "seemed to say it was not so simple as that." In 
other words, he is saying, indirectly, that this is not a mere ghost 
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story designed to instill shallow, physiological fright. At a loss 
to qualify it, Douglas says: "For Dreadful— dreadfulnessl" (Or, as 
Conrad put it in "The Heart of Darkness": "the horror, the horror"). 
Hie vital question being evaded is: which does the governess 
love wore: good or evil, innocence or corruption? Is she attracted 
to the children because she thinks then angelic, or because she thinks 
the® deaonic. 
Hie answer is to be found in the minds of the reader. 
In any event, this searching out of Motives, this suspicion of 
surface meanings, this propensity to exaggerate facts which themselves 
are mostly ambiguous, and read into then the possibilities one seeks 
oneself, is just what Jaiaes expects of his reader, because it puts his 
in the position of the governess as she stands outside the dining room 
window, imitating the stance of the ghost she has just seen, and 
awaiting there, expectantly, the reaction of Mrs, Grose, the house­
keeper, at whose expense she is playing this diabolic little trick. 
When Mrs. Grose surprises the governess by being startled and 
bewildered by her behavior, the governess imaediately assuaes that she 
no longer "needs to respect the bloom of Mrs. Grose" and suddenly wants 
to "share" her knowledge with her. She suggests that the other has 
guessed at the identity of Quint. 
Mrs. Grose's bewildered response is: "I haven't guessed ... 
how can I if you don't imagine?"22 she tries to alter the drift of 
22 Mrs. Grose's response is exactly what Jraes's himself would 
be, speaking to the reader. 
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their conversation by suggesting church. To this suggestion the 
governess rejoins: "Oh, I*bi not fit for church," (italics nine) 
Upon which, she sees in Mrs. Grose*s eyes, the "faraway clioraer of a 
consciousness sore acute." 
Mr*. Grose, who probably represents in this novel the innocence 
of ignorance—and also the irresponsibility of such innocent ignorance— 
always avoids ultimate knowledge and tries to disdain responsibility. 
"Such things are not for rae," she says of the school letter regarding 
Miles* "dismissal" (for she can't—the governess assumes—read); and 
she later tells the governess that the children are not in her charge, 
T»»o governess (again, in her "crystaline" wanner) describes Mrs. 
Grose as a "stout, simple, plain, clean, wholesome" woaan, "a magni­
ficent monument to the blessing of a want of imagination," and as a 
woiiian who had no direct "ccciMunion with the source of [the governess's] 
trouble," 
Mrs, Grose plays the sane kind of role as Captain Delano in 
Melville's story, "Benito Cerino"—the unassuming innocent who is 
saved (bat who does not quite save others) because he never assumes 
the true evil of his position and therefore does not bring destruction 
upon himself. 
Ironically, Mrs, Grose also assumes the role that Jamas hist self 
takes, generally—that of the artist who refuses to become involved 
in his own illusions, in order that he sight remain innocent himself 
of whatever interpretations are put upon his illusion—who can presume 
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to innocence at the same tiiae that he exposes his readers to what 
appear to be diabolical traps; the writer, that is, who remains un« 
involved in what he claims is the general human condition, which is 
to fall into traps and be bewildered. 
It is here that James falls under suspicion of being only an 
imitator of life, or a sere storyteller, fabricating romance for its 
own sake, who is not interested in making, or causing to be made— 
distinctions. Actually, this iminvolvement is just another exanple 
of his irony*23 
The governess describes the male ghost to Mrs. Grose, insists 
that he "was no gentlenan" (probably, because he wore no hat), and 
Mrs, Grose verifies the description as being like that of Quint, a 
Corner valet at Sly, 
In this first of the governess's assumptions, which is based on 
no fact, whatsoever, and which is almost an out-and-out lie, she tells 
Mrs, Grose that Quint was looking for Miles: "I know, I know I" she 
cries, although there is no natural, literal way that she could have 
known, Mrs* Grose admits knowledge of the former close alliance which 
existed between Quint, an alliance which site tried, unsuccessfully, to 
sever, but which she couldn't and wouldn't report to her employer, 
because "he diita't like tale-bearing, he hated complaints." 
Hie eutployer on liar ley Street has becotae, by this time, almost 
3̂To be discussed later* 
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a symbol of God or Satan, or Ultimate Indifference. Hie governess 
answers Mrs, Grose by saying that she herself would have told the 
master—although later she does no such thing, herself, until she is 
forced to it later, when a similar situation arises. 
The governess again glories in the fact that she is an "expiatory 
victim" whose duty it is to save the children for the Master. She 
says; H$e were cut off, really, together; we were united in our 
danger. They had nothing but me, and I—well, I had them." This 
"thea" in italics could refer to the children or to the ghosts, fbr 
it is used thus ambiguously each tine. 
Hie governess begins to watch the children "in stiffled suspense"j 
and soon she notices the children's "charming" way of letting her 
alone "without appearing to drop her"; and she is a«azed by their 
self-sufficiency; in fact, she feels she "walked in a world of their 
invention" and (almost regretably it would seem) that they "had no 
occasion, whatever, to call upon [iters]," 
SOOT after this, the governess takes Flora to the lake—like the 
"Sea of Azof" and immediately she senses the existence of another 
ghost. "There was no ambiguity in anything," (italics mine) she 
proudly affirms, "none whatever; at least in the conviction I, from 
one Element to another, found forcing as to what I should see straight 
before m and across the lake as a consequence of raising my eyes." 
There is, of course, no ambiguity, because she has already 
eliminated the possibility of it, even before she raises her eyes. 
She sees the female ghost and also assumes that Flora tries to 
divert her attention from the ghost with a "morsel," a stick which 
the ckiId tries to force into the hole of a piece of wood. (Hi© 
Freudian symbolism of this episode and the use of the hat and lake 
symbols have been noted by Edmund Wilson) She rims to Mrs. Grose 
aid cries: "They know, they knowI" 
In response to Mrs, Grose's blank expression, she replies" 
"What we know!" and she says, "Flora saw!" and, therewith, she imme­
diately declares the ghost to be her predecessor, Miss Jessel, al­
though she ttas never seen Hiss Jessel. To Mrs, Grose's proposal 
that tiiey verify her finding, by asking Flora, the governess cries: 
"Ho, for God's sake, don't • • • she'll liel" 
Hie housekeeper surnises that if the child is concealing aware­
ness of the ghost site is doing it to spare thy governess, "HO, no," 
the governess declares, like Kurtz in Conrad's "Heart of Darkness," 
there are depths, depths." 
in describing Miss Jessel she says the ghost stared at her own 
eyes "as if they might really have resembled sine" (the second time 
she associates herself obviously with the ghosts) and she describes 
the look as "indescribable," a "fury of intention." 
The governess then poses a real puzzle of this story, a possible 
flaw or opaque virtue in its mechanics,̂  when she asks Mrs. Grose how 
24 I as indebted to Professor Fred Korsten for suggesting the 
alternative opinion that this apparent "flaw" in the story sight be 
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she could have described the ghost "to the last detail," if she did 
not really see it. She way, of course, have seen a picture of Miss 
Jessel; but, if so, the picture is not mentioned by Janes, iter* is 
that one hole in the illusion, where interpreter and author can look 
squarely at one another and shake their head wryly at the cleverness 
a riierit: it being the crucial opaque center of the story which keeps 
it truly ambiguous, which leaves the story open to the interpretation 
that the ghosts are to be taken literally, and not figuratively or 
as figments of the governess's imagination* I tend to agree (see 
footnote 26), and use the word "flaw" only because (in this one case) 
I don't give Janes the credit for having realized (beforehand) the 
importance of this incidence. If I did, I should have to assuue that 
he did want to have us take the ghosts literally, in which case, he 
wouid either have written a mere "ghost" story (which 1 don't think 
Janes ever meant us to believe, despite his tongue-in-cheek avowals 
of sane), or that he meant the ghosts to represent an external force 
of evil. And with this I would heartily disagree. Evil in Henry 
James's world is not a force fro* without (as it was, for instance, 
for his father), but tie rely awareness, knowledge, viewed perversely. 
Evil is the ectttaltt«eat, at one" poie of reference, of a charged 
"truth" not accurately (that is, perversely) transmitted. It is the 
possession of knowledge viewed diabolically by someone without it. 
Once he possesses the perversely viewed knowledge, that person his-
self becomes a "repositor" looked at diabolically or enviously, as 
the case way be„ Evil, in Jaaes's world is utterly in the eye of 
the beholder and every beholder is, at some point, tewporarily be­
wildered. !Vhen he is no longer bewildered, he no longer transmits; 
he is no longer alive; he is a dead battery, a lifeless repositor. 
Life, in James's World, is thus, passionate curiosity. Evil, con­
sequently, is limitation artificially imposed by inadequate knowledge. 
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of one and the willful duplicity of the other.25 
Aftor learning from Mrs. Grose about the former "conspiracy" 
of Miles and Quint, a finding which she labels "immensely to the 
purpose," she waits for further developments. "I waited and I waited," 
she says; and she finds her waiting "so iraaensely »ore interesting." 
In describing (in her "crystaline manner") the attitude of the 
children towards her at this state of the story, the governess says 
sonething curious which sight account for the "vulgarity" which 
suddenly develops in Flora at the end. The governess says: "Some­
times, indeed, when I dropped into coarseness, I perhaps cam© across 
traces of little understandings between them [the children] by which 
one of thea should keep ae occupied while the other slipped away. 
It is possible that the children were simply devising ways of 
escaping the governess's "coarseness"—coarseness (the extent of which 
This desire for, yet fear of, illusion and its apparent opposite, 
reality, is a thetste which the arch ironist, Jean Oenet develops in his 
play. From the Balcony. Everyone in this play is after illusion—even 
the Revolutionary, who most abhors illusion and the bourgeois human need 
for it; and each manipulates his private, "Whore-house," illusion con­
summately and demands an illusion which is absolutely consuming in its 
potentialities. Hut he also demands, at the same time, one tiny flaw 
in the manipulated illusion, because only by this concrete proof that 
he is pretending illusion, can he maintain it and also maintain his 
belief that lie will not be swallowed up in the horror of unambiguous 
reality: total, absolute, meaningless, nonduelistic actuaTity which 
precludes no illusory state into which to flee, once it oecoaes too 
oppressive. This, of course, is also a favorite Conradian these ("The 
Secret Sharer"), Shavian ("Don Juan in Hell"), Kafkian (The Castle); 
and one also excellently developed by Ingaar Bergaan in his movie, The 
Magician, not to mention Herman Hesse's treatment of it in Hie 
Steppenwolf. " 
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the reader can't know) which may be the source later of Flora's 
"horrors" in speech that so overwhelm Mrs. Grose. 
Soon after this, the governess meets the ghost of Quint upon 
the stairway. They face each other with their "cocnnon intensity," 
There "was nothing in [herself] that didn* t meet and measure hin." 
(italics mine) She returns to her roon to discover Flora looking 
out the window. Hie child turns to her "in so rauch of her candour 
and so little of her nightgown" that, as she says: "I had never 
such a sense of losing an advantage acquired (the thrill of which 
had been so prodigious)." 
Hie voyeuristic flavor of this passage is representative of 
her entire attitude towards the supposed coramunion of children and 
demons. When the child tells her that she did not see anyone out­
side the window, the governess thinks she "lied," and she wonders 
why she does not just confront the child with her own lio, "give 
it to her straight in her lovely little lighted face," in the 
expectation that they both sight "learn perhaps in the strangeness 
of [their] fate, where [they] are and what it means." 
A few nights later the governess sees the female ghost on the 
stairway in a position of woe, which she herself is later to duplicate 
exactly, even to the cause. She returns to Flora, and this time she 
is convinced the child is communing with the ghost of Miss Jessel 
outside the window. The "striking of a match complete[s] the picture," 
she says. Flora, she says, "was face-to-face with the apparition we 
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had set at the lake," 
What the governess does not realize is that it sight possibly 
be only her own image she sees outside the window—reflected in the 
window glass—particularly since she says she just before lit a match, 
the light fro® which would throw her image, forward and reflect it, 
She goes towards the boy's room, but is conscious that someone 
is moving about outside. She goes into another room, beneath the 
tower, and looks out into the yard. There she sees Miles and assumes 
that he is contuning with the ghost of Quint, who she supposes is on 
the tower, although she cannot see the tower, since she is directly 
under it. Both children sight very well be looking out and up at the 
moon; although it is more probable that they aare communing, not with 
the moon, or the ghosts either, but with one another, playing a gase 
on the governess—Miles from down in the yard and Flora out her 
window. This possibility gains substantiation when Miles later 
admits to the governess that his being outside was all a trick be­
tween hia and his sister to surprise the governess and convince her 
that he was not just a good little boy. 
There is still another possible explanation of the ghost's 
appearance, which would be another, aor© devastating turn-of-the-
screw, aii explanation which seems to be borne out by one of Mi les* s 
statements later. "Ibis is the possibility that the children at no 
time commune with the ghost of their own sex (if they comtme with 
them at all), but actually with the ghost of the opposite sex. This 
would explain (if we first agree with the idea of the children's being 
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corrupt) why Flora did not see Miss Jesse1 by the lake (she would 
only have seen Quint, were he to appear)} and it would explain why 
Miles, later on, does not see the ghost of Quint outside the dining 
room window, but does sees to expect to see a female, since he asks: 
"Is it she?" 
However, this, again, is falling into the carefully laid trap 
which James has prepared for usj it is failing into the habit of 
assuming one's desires for reality. Such a twist of the screw 
would ®ake the story even store "horrible" in its implications, but, 
the question is, should on© desire such eventualities? 
When Mrs. Grose suggests that they inform the Master about the 
situation at Ely, the governess imagines the contempt he would have 
for the "fine machinery [she] had set in motion to attract his 
attention to [her] slighted charas." Later she watches for Quint*s 
ghost "in vain in the circle of the shrubbery . . . But they resiain 
unaccompanied and eapty, and [she] continue [s] unmolested; if un­
molested one could call a young woman whose sensibilities had, in 
the most extraordinary fashion, not declined but deepened." 
She realises that the loss of this sensibility would "distress 
[her] such store than to keep it." She also wonders why the children 
"never resent [her] inexorable ... perpetual society," and at this 
moment Miles confronts her with accusations. He wants sore freedoms 
he also demands a reason why no plans have been made for his return 
to school, and he wants to have communication with his uncle. 
TMs immediately makes the governess want to get away from the 
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boy, and instead of attending church with the children (she is out­
side the church with Miles), she dashes hose with the plan of leaving 
lily at once. She sits down upon the stairway in the sane position 
and attitude of woe she had formerly seen the female ghost adopt; and 
when she walks into her classroora, a moiaent later, she is only slisrhtly 
startled to find Miss Jesse1 sitting at her desk, writing a letter, 
regarding, not her own, but the governess's presence as an intrusion. 
Since the children, upon returning fro® church, do not enquire 
about her desertion, the governess goes to Mrs. Grose, who now "faces 
the flame fron her straight chair in the dusky, shining roar,"; and to 
the governess the housekeeper is a "large, clean, image off the 'put 
away*—of drawers closed and locked and rest without a remedy." She 
discovers that the children have told Mrs. Grose that they oust all 
do nothing but what the governess likes. The governess then tells 
Mrs* Grose an obvious lie—that she returned house to meet a friend, 
"A friend—you?" Mrs, Grose replies in evident amazement, to which 
the governess replies? "Oh, yes, I have a couple [italics mine]," 
And then she tells Mrs. Grose that she cane hoise to talk with Miss 
Jessel, although this was not her consciously expressed reason (and, 
furthermore, there was not even a recorded exchange between her and 
the ghost). She tells Mrs, Grose that Miss Jessel "suffers the 
torments," and she says that Miss Jessel "wants Flora," 
She agrees then to write to her employer. That night she goes 
to Milos*s rot®!. In equivocal terras they discuss their general 
75 
situation once more; she embraces mid possibly frightens the boy; 
and there is an unexplanable draft of cold wind that blows in, 
despite the closed windows. The boy abruptly asks to be left alone. 
The next day Miles approaches her of his own accord and entertains 
her by playing upon a piano. She is wrapt up in watching the boy 
that she forgets about Flora; and when she remembers that she has 
"slept at her post," she surmises that Miles's entertainment was a 
trick to get her aside so that his sister could slip away froa her. 
She dashes to the front hall and confronts Mrs. Grose. The two of 
the® search the house. 
Then, without a hat—because "that woman is always without 
one"—the governess goes out to search for Flora, accompanied by 
Mrs. Grose, She has told Mrs. Grose that Miles is upstairs with 
Quint and that Flora must be at the lake with Miss Jesse1. They find 
Flora across the lake; the child is surprised at the appearance of 
the governess, without a hat: "Where are your things?" she asks. 
"Where yours are, my dear?" the governess replies; and thai she 
asks the child, pointblank, where Miss Jessel is. 
Immediately, Miss Jessel appears before the eyes of the governess. 
This appearance produces in her a "thrill of joy at having brought 
proof," She discovers that Mrs. Grose does not share her vision, 
nor does the child admit to doing so. Flora is horrified now, not 
necessarily by the ghost, but possibly by the governess; and she 
appears suddenly to have becoae like an old wosan. 
"What a dreadful turn, to be sure, Miss!" Mrs. Grose replies; 
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and she tries to confort the child into thinking the shole thing is 
a joke. Flora and Mrs. Grose return alone to the house and the 
governess sinks down on the grass in despair. 
when she returns to the house she finds that Flora's things have 
been removed frcm her room; she discovers from the housekeeper that 
the child now lives in terror of her, and that she has begun to 
utter "horrors." The governess has the child taken away from Bly, 
and Mrs, Grose leaves with her, sounding a strange note, by saying 
to the governess, who plans to stay to work cm Miles: "I'll save you 
without hi»." 
This possibly eeans that she—having given up on Miles, will 
save Flora, not the governess. We don't know for sure to who® she 
eakes the remark. 
The governess and Miles are left alone together, lie had come 
to her the night before, because, evidently, he finally liked to be 
close to her; mid, the next day, he repeats this direction of his 
sentiments. The governess tries to draw from him the secret reason 
for his dismissal fro® school. She feels "she had nothing aore to 
teach hia," but that it would be "preposterous, with a child so 
endowed, to forego the help one sight wrest fro® absolute intelligence." 
She admits to the boy that she stayed on purely to discover his 
secret: "Well, yes—I may as well make a clean breast of it," she 
says. "It was precisely for that" (that she stayed). 
Peter Quint suddenly appears again at the window, as she 
continues her probing for Miles's secret; and she feels as though 
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she is "fighting with a denon for a hunan soul«M Miles admits that 
he stole the letter she had written to his uncle, because, he said, 
he wanted to see what she had written about him. The governess in­
stantly feels that the "cause was [hers] and that [she] should surely 
get all," 
As Quint watches then from outside the window at Miles's hack, 
Miles adnits that he "said things" at school, things which were 
reported, things that he told only to people he liked, things that 
were told to other people they liked. 
The boy's sisdeataeanor, in effect, is probably no more or less 
than the misdemeanor of which the various narrators of this story 
are guilty or innocent: he tells innocent (at least, ambiguous, 
happenings) which are misconstrued, at will, by people, like the 
governess, who desire to know the worst. 
The governess is exasperated by Miles's innocent reply, which 
in no way vindicates her. Suddenly, she "springs upon" the boy, 
ostensibly to shield him frora Quint's ghost. She shrieks, 'Ho aore, 
no aore, no wore!" at the ghost of Quint. 
Miles cries: "Is she here?—a question which baffles even the 
governess, because no female has been referred to. Edmund Wilson 
asstsaes that the boy has scsaehow communicated with his sister, and 
has learned the circumstances of her delusion; but James does not 
tell of any sudi meetingj in fact, he aakes a point of saying that 
the children are kept apart. It !tay be that James only wanted to 
draw fro® the boy an exclamation which would prove, beyond any doubt. 
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the boy's innocence; although it is just as likely that he used 
this fceans, instead, as a way of maintaining ambiguity—at least, 
in regard to the boy. 
The governess is staggered by the feainine pronoun. She "sieze [s], 
stupifieti—some sequel to what {they] had done to Flora." Her instant 
reaction to this realization, however, is to "show the boy something 
better still than that," She would confront hi® not with the ghost 
of Miss Jesse!, but with that of Quint. Or else—if her motives are 
indeed sincere—she would confront hi® with no ghost at all, but with 
©mpty space. She repeats the word "she," and Miles answers her 
stupification with: "Hiss Jessell" 
Mow it may be that Miles—if he did see ghosts—saw only the 
ghost of Miss Jessel, aid here, he is expecting to see her again. 
If this were the governess's realization, her horror of what she 
has done to Flora is simply her realization that Flora, possibly, 
had never seen the feraale ghost, that the girl was either innocent 
of seeing ghosts at all, or, possibly, saw not Miss Jessel, but 
Quint, instead. When the governess then tells the boy that there is 
something better than Miss Jessel to be seen at the window. Miles 
creist "It's he?" in the fora of a question. The governess immediately 
pounces for the proof. She cries: "rfhom do you mean by he?" 
The next exclamation is always assumed to co®e frora Miles but 
we can't actually be sure, by the arrangement of the words on the 
page, who actually says the words: "Peter Quint, you devilI" 
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It could be the governess angrily putting words into the 
boy's mouth, forcing the reply which she wants to hear froci him; 
or, it could actually be the hoy speaking* But it does seera more 
likely that the boy would call the governess a "witch," rather than 
a devil, whereas the woman would naturally refer to the boy in this 
manner. 
To add to this argument, the next exclamation of the boy*3 is: 
"Where?"--a response which, unexpectedly, overjoys the governess. 
"I have you," she thinks; and she surmises that Quint has lost 
the boy forever. She replies: "There, there 1" obviously indicating 
the window at the boy's back, the view of which has been, up to now, 
cut off from hiis. Miles turns around and sees—as the governess is 
led to believe—nothing "but the quiet day." 
If she is demonic, she thinks she has taken him away from Quint; 
if she is good, she thinks she has exorcised the deson. But if tae 
boy is truly demonic, he has simply been cut off frota the source of 
his power and he dies. 
The question exists of how, if Miles is innocent, he could know 
about Quint's ghost, since he possibly refers to hint when he asks: 
"Is it he?" The boy could, of course, be thinkin? of his uncle, who® 
he ami the governess had just been discussing in regard to the stolen 
letter, Wilson's explanation is that the boy somehow conraunicated 
with his sister, but this would not entirely explain the technical 
difficulty. 
Clearly, the ultimate interpretation is left up to the reader. 
so 
James has reached a nearly sure balance. The innocent readers will 
never see the story as anything More than a ghost story about demonic 
children (an irony in itself, since it is^the innocent who so easily 
accept the possibility of there being such things as demons), and 
the sore delving, more suspicious, nor© assuming ©inds will always 
stumble upon an arabiouous author at the end of the story, and have 
to bear the brunt of their own suspicions. 
Technically, however, one thing is clear and unambiguous, and 
that is the govemess*s reactions. Considering the raany assumptions 
she stakes, which are based on no fact at all, one must conclude, 
finally, that she herself, is either terribly frustrated, or sad. 
There is the possibility that the children are innocent, but not the 
governess. In spite of the anotaaloly that she holds "crystaline" 
in her consciousness the record of the many anomalies and obscurities 
on the story, and that she is the "authority," the only one from who® 
we can get the facts, her "dreadful boldness of aind" finally reveals 
her peculiarity for what it is although she does not, necessarily, 
ever realist© it herself. 
* * * 
James's representative works are all this kind of ingenious 
celebration of contradict!cm and stipulated aabifjuity. As in the 
"Turn of the Screw," the interpretation of the ambiguities within 
the work depends upon the temperament of the reader. The final 
turn-of-the-screw may very well be at his expense. If he wants to 
81 
assume the worse, if that is how his mind functions, then Janes 
gives hi® all the rope he needs to hang hinself. Hi® story is itself 
consciously ambiguous, in the sense that the final interpretation is 
as much a reflection of the reader's nind as it is of the author's. 
This means of filtering a story through the sometimes faulty 
consciousness of one of the characters—a character who, yet, at the 
sase tine—gives a clear picture of what happens for those who want 
to see clearly (and is, in that sense, "crystaline"), demands 
conscious adroitness on the part of the writer. To stake, as James 
sayss 
• . .the presented occasion tell all its story 
itself, reaaln shut up in its own presence and 
yet en that patch1 oJTstaTed-'out ground "becoise 
thoroughly interesting and regain thoroughly 
clear, is a process not remarkable, no doubt, 
so long as a very light wight is laid cm it, 
but difficult enough to challenge and inspire 
great adroitness so soon as the elements dealt 
wtVh begin to shape up,1'''" "nellies mine) 2" 
The governess exactly mirrors what she sees at Bly, and in that 
sense, she hold "crystaline in her consciousness the record of the 
aany anomalies and obscurities" around herj but her reflect!arts 
iipan what she sees, her assumptions about the® are her own eccentric 
way of evaluating experience, and not, any longer, a coraott denominator 
of human experience. Her "authority," finally, is disproved by irony: 
first by Janes, who gradually lets us see the difference between when 
The Future of the Novel, op. cit., p. 65. 
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she sees and what she reports: then—if the reader is discerning— 
by the reader. If the reader is not discerningt then he himself 
becomes an object of irony. 
This "crystaline" treatment of the "particular case" seems to 
extend the "picture" indefinately—as indefinate as are the minds of 
all of the readers who will look into it. Or, as Blacknur says of 
James's technique, generally: "The secret of perception in tlie reader 
becomes very near the secret of creaticm in the artist." 
CHAPTER IV 
THE HUMAN PROPENSITY FOR INVOLVEMENT 
A person's disposition to involve and expose himself in 
illusion—this general human liability to "fall into traps and be 
bewildered"* is the haaan propensity upon which Jaraesian drama (and 
drama generally) depends. It is upon the ground of this general 
human predicament that a protagonist stands, and from which he demands 
our sympathy. In fact, it is only when he succeeds in remaining (Hi 
this connon ground that he jrains for himself the name "protagonist". 
He becomes an "antagonist" when he forfeits his common humanity; to 
be free of bewilderment. 
No one is more sympathetic (even a villain) than when he seems 
most bewildered, even when he is only bewildered by his own villainy, 
or by his inability to perceive his own villainy. 
In this sense, the governess in "Hie Turn of the Screw," for 
instance, is always a protagonist, and, therefore, always naintains 
our sympathy, even when she is aost bewildered. This, actually, is 
rather remarkable about the governess, because, other than her be­
wilderment, which takes the for® of self-delusion, there is very 
little else about her that is remarkable—other than that she seeas 
so human. She is one of the jaost self-deluding creatures imaginable; 
*The Future of the novel, op. cit,, p, 56. 
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and yet, so humanly chaining is her bewilderment, so perceptive 
her mind, so reflective her soul, so crystaline her consciousness — 
so generously ambiguous her point of view—-that not only do we permit 
her to completely dominate our winds and attention, but wo alaost 
permit her to delude us, also. 
And this sort of thin<r, of course, is just what Jaaes wants of 
us. If we weren't liable to delusion, we vouldn*t be hunan; he 
wouldn't want us to be reading his bodesj we wouldn't be able to get 
involved in thera. His effectiveness lasts only so long as the general 
let of husanity is to fall into traps and be bewildered. 
Yet in order to expose his readers to "bewilderment," Jaaes must 
be ingenious (complexity being innately, his second nature}. He irmst 
be ingenious in order to outwit the reader; and it is necessary for 
hia to outwit the reader because the reader aabivalently demands a 
craplex illusion which not only wakes hin appear to be likewise ingenious 
(that is, able to manipulate illusion), but also suspends hint in 
illusion—-illusion being what the htKian consciousness has the greatest 
propensity for. 
Ironically, Jaaes must appear to do all this at the saae time 
he seeas not to. He nust, in other words, appear not to be too in­
genious; because if he were too ingenious, he would shatter the mirror, 
break the crystal, destroy the illusion. He would play havoc with 
tue necessary ambiguous relationship which must exist between the 
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illusionist and his audience. Ho would, in other words, appear to 
be too gloatingly unbewildered; he would appear not to be human, to 
be either too inhueanly dispassionate or too passionately nanipula-
. 2 
tive. 
Yet the artist, too, no less than the wader, feels a need for 
total involvement. Hie artist's natural ispulse is to involve hiaself 
totally in his own illusion, to display his ingenuity obviously (avid 
thus elicit credit for his illusion) at the same tin© that he joins 
the reader in the labyrinth. However, if ha is too obviously mani­
pulative he can lose his reader as completely as when he loses 
creative perspective. 
Jmes keeps out of his illusions (at the sa»»e tine that he se@®s 
to be lost within them) by limiting his objectivity, by filtering 
his "pictures" through the consciousness of his "reporters," his 
"precursors," his "envelope narrators," 
lie then reveals his ingenuity wore—at the saa© time that he 
seems t© reveal it even less—by Baking his "reporters" also seem 
not to be too ingenious* He does this for the same reasons so that 
they, too, will not seem to be too ingenious, so that they, too, will 
see® natural, will sees normal: 
. . ,«e want it clean, goodness knows, but we also 
want it thick, and wo get thickness in the human 
consciousness that entertains and records, that 
2 For instance, a reader will readily suspend his disbelief for 
another human, but he looks with fearful distrust upon a sorcerer, 
since a sorcerer, by definition, has the power totally to involve 
one. II© does not, necessarily, play the illusion gaiae fairly; he 
might not uninvolve one. 
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amplifies and interprets it . . . her© prodigies, 
when they cm® straight, come with an effect 
imperiled; they keep all their character, on the 
other hand, by loosing through some other history— 
the indespensible history of somebody*s normal 
relation to something.3 
That is, so that they, too, partake of the general human propensity 
to fall into traps and be bewildered. 
In other words, without seeiaing to, James, as before said, 
purposely portrays his people as being slightly dense I Here is 
the supreme irony of Janes's work: that his people who seen to be 
overly perceptive, and who are subjects of critical derision for 
just this reason, are cloudy in their knowing, are so overly per­
ceptive that they constantly isisinterpret.^ 
And this is just as Janes wants it; because, despite their 
higher plane of reference, despite the fact that they seen to breathe 
air not usually filtered by ordinary consciousnesses, they are even 
more hanan in their bewilderment. Even more natural. 
... '0*ey may not be shown as knowing too much 
and feeling too much—not certainly for their 
remaining remarkable, but for their remaining 
"Natural" and "Typical," for their having the 
needftil comunicacies with their own precious 
3The Future of the Novel, op. cit., p. 66. 
4 An irony that almost totally escapes a critic like Maxwell 
Geisaar who, in his nearly hysterical attack on Jaraes in Henry .Tames 
and the Jacobites (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963) stumble's,' absurdly, 
into' aiatost every' trap this writer has laid for critics such as he. 
Geisaar is almost too hurean. His density compares aaazingly to the 
Governess in "The Turn of the Screw." 
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liability to fall into traps and be bewildered. 
It seems probably that if we wore never to be 
bewildered there would never be a story to tell 
about us; we should partake of the superior 
nature of the all-knowing immortals whose annals 
are dreadfully dull so long as flurried humans 
are not, for the positive relief of bored Olympians 
nixed up with them. Therefore it is that the wary 
reader for the most part warns the novelist against 
making his characters too interpretive of the mud­
dle off fate, or in other worths, too divinely, or 
pritjgishly clever ... 
What this monitor, therefor®, always proclaims Janes says, is; 
. . , give us plenty of bewilderment, so long as 
there is plenty of slashing out at the bewilderment, 
too. But don't, we beseech you, give us too such 
intelligence; for intelligence—well endangers; 
endangers not perhaps the slasher h in self but the 
very slashing, the subject natter of the self-
respecting story. It opens too sany considerations, 
possibilities, issues; it way lead the shattered 
into dreary realms where slashing somehow fails and 
falls to the "round.6 
Jataes sees in excessive intelligence, not only a threat to the 
"very slashing," which is what drama is, but also a threat to that 
primary source of bewilderment which is life*s apparent anbiguity 
itself; or, at least, the human propensity to look upon life as being 
ambiguous—and then to throw himself eagerly into that asabiguity. 
In Jaaesian fiction it is of what the artist is conscious, what 
he reflects; and then, concurrently, what his characters are conscious 
of and reflect, that make the story. The illusion lasts only so 
long as the author, his characters, and tlie reader remain temporarily 
5 Hie Future of the Novel, op. cit., p. 56. 
6Ibid. 
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in illusion about the knowledge or experience or critical power of 
the other. 
Most of the ironic burden, therefore, falls upon the "register" 
of experience, the "reporters," the "precursor," as Jaaes calls them. 
These fictional characters are almost always peg# for the reader's 
ironical minds to use in working their way through illusions. Thus, 
if the reader does not see through this purposely dense "reporter," 
if he remains in illusion about his, he will become, himself, a butt 
of James's irony, and also a butt of irony for other readers who ar© 
more perceptive. 
It is when the reader tries to keep up with Jaaes's ironical 
convolutions that the full burden of the story falls upon him. "Tell 
sue of what the artist or character or reader is conscious," James says, 
"and I will tell you what he is." 
But first the reader oust participate in the illusion, partake 
of the drama, and then find or lose himself in it, as the case may 
be. If his discriminatory powers are as acute as James's—or, at 
least, as acute as Jaaes hopes they will be, the reader will thread 
his way through the labyrinth of ambiguities and ironies, through 
the character's involvements; that is—around the James's pegs-of-
iroay—and finally arrive alongside James at the final stairstep of 
irony. 
What Jaaes feared in himself and in his readers (and so disparaged 
in his characters) is excessive irony, which tends to dissipate all 
illusion, even that most genuinely presented—oven that which life 
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itself (whatever its impetus) presents. If the artist is too soon 
seen through, then his illusions will themselves become the stuff of 
the skeptics, the object of irony, on the part of his audience, iiis 
creative power will be dissipated. 
The potential villain, therefore, in James's work is not 
"bewildenncnt," not "illusion," but excessive irony. Irony nay be 
the only safeguard one has against false illusion; it nay be the 
human liability to humor which offsets the human liability to 
bewilderment. Yet if a person overworks this liability as such as 
he sometimes overextonds his desire for illusion, his final stance 
can be one of irony-for-its-ovn-sake, which is only another kind 
of illusion. Such a stance is paradoxical, and ambiguous, because 
it annihilates before it can gain it, any meaning which it ostensibly 
seeks. 
A too highly developed ironist accepts nothing; yet he is so 
meticulous in his dismissals, so almost aesthetic in his appreciation 
of nothing, that his dismissal s@o»s a perverse kind of regard. Ho 
seems not to be intelligently paradoxical, but childishly self-
contradictory. 
Such persons, fiewselves, becooe objects of irony on the psrt of 
artists, who look upon then as innocents—»knowled^eable innocents who 
are revealed for what they are by soneono else only a little wore or 
less knowledgeable (or, as the case aay be, by someone only a little 
more or less innocent than they. The artist, or those who view this 
type of person stand outside, at the raild, bemused stance, bewildered 
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by such a person's apparent lack of bewi Ida men t. 
This is why, in Jamesian novels, it is often so difficult to 
determine just who is innocent and who is not, Is it the knowledge­
able, worldly, unbewildered types, like Gilbert Osmund, for instance, 
of Portrait of A Lady? Or is it the bewildered, open-to-ignorance 
initiates to life like Daisy Miller? Both types, in a way, sees 
hardened against self-know ledge.; that is they both avoid meaning. 
The Daisy Millers sees to refuse to see meaning, and the Gilbert 
Osmunds refuse to look for it. Hie only type totally imerses her­
self in life, the other refuses to do anything sore than clutch 
aesthetically to its external objects. And both types, thereby, 
appear to be innocent to those who are involved, not only in life, but 
in the search for significance of their involvement. They appear 
innocent, that is, to those #10 are somehow both inside and outside 
life, viewing their involvement at the same tine, 
Jaiaes himself—who said, "Much of life is fit only to enrich 
our stores of irony"?- is very nearly guilty of the Osmund-like 
predeliction to aestheticis™. Like Osiaund he seems to fondle each 
object or situation or person ironically, the better to dismiss it 
as not having been worth his perusal in the first place. But, at 
the same tine, he seems to be so fond of anything which he has 
granted his dismissal, that he cannot seen to bear parting with it. 
^The Future of fee Novel, op. cit., p. 174. 
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Thus he seens to get no broader a view of the object or of himself 
than his own ironic opinion of it. Yet he becomes so possessed by 
objects he denies any propensity to power over himself, that he ends 
up a prisoner of his wn possessive objectivity. He ends up nothing 
sore than a sum of his objects, bound up in a vicious circle of his 
own object-perusing, so If-ar.ihi latin £ being. 
Janes sews guilty of this predilection in such works as "The 
Beast in the Jungle," and "The Jolly Comer," and, even, "The Turn 
of the Screw"—works which almost fail to escape an irony-for-its-
own-sake attitude, works which soon to bo literary "playthings." 
Sidney Alexander, an art critic, writing for The Reporter, says 
of this kind of art, which he refers to in its so re COBSROR najae as 
"abstract art"? 
. . .  T h e  m o n e n t  y o u  o l i n i n a t c  subject, the 
painting (or culpture) becomes its own subject; 
that is, it becomes an object, the t is, it be cosies 
a thing. Mow things that stand for nothing but 
themselves can only proen the stuff of which they 
are made, iience modern arts are obsessed by 
"thingness"; hence all sorts of anterials are in­
serted into the painting; hence the scratching and 
gouging and didling of surfaces and hurling of 
paint and making "sculptures" of junk . . . What 
else is there to do? Philosophically these objects, 
these things, are not abstractions of anything, 
internal or external. They coraunicate nothing 
but self-consciousness of their own substance. 
What saves James (and even his most "abstract" stories) is that his 
art always refers outside of itself for meaning. It does this by 
keeping tne human consciousness, the hu*an liability for involvement, 
"Sidney Alexander, essay on Bernard Oerenson, "Trio Last 
Aesthete," The Reporter (July 18, 1963). 
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foreiaost in the picture. It simply keeps "people" as its objects, 
as its "field of force"—people who are immersed in the ariajaolous 
substance of life. 
A Ja»esian character who best fulfills this role is Isabelle 
Archer in Hie Portrait of A Lady, the foil to Gilbert Osmund. 
Isabelle is also an ironist, of sorts, but she is always bewildered, 
too, and therefore most human. As Jawes says of her; "The love of 
knowledge in her mind co-existed ... with the finest capacity for 
irgnorance." 
Isabelle Archer's most human, and also most ironically consuming 
characteristic is her candidness. She naively assumes that if she 
can put her problems neatly in words, if they can find verbal ex­
pression, they will somehow be solved. She has this same attitude 
towards all illusions; and because of it (or despite it), the 
illusive mystery of life envelops her all the more. She is like 
Adel© Quested in Forster's novel, Passage to India, who is so sure 
the right approach, the correct word, the definitive action will 
dissolve all the mystery of the ages surrounding her and iii her— 
when, in reality the saore she seeks to clarify the mystery around 
her, the raoro confusing it becomes. 
Isabelle Archer, in other words, is the "protagonist"—the 
"first straggler"—the one raost involved in nystery, yet—at the 
same time—the one least aware of this fact. She is least aware, 
like Marcher in "The lieast xn znv Jungle," that the mystery of her life, 
93 
which so awes and involves those around her, is simply her involve­
ment in trying to dispell the mystery of her life. Even her husband, 
Gilbert Osraund, whose own total lack, of involvement is what so 
mystifies Isabella, almost finds himself transcended by his wife's 
involvement. Even Gilbert Osmund is almost pulled out of himself 
temporarily by observing his wife's involvement. 
Isabella's plunging descent into bewilderment. Her "capacity 
for ignorance," for illusion, for not seeing things as they really 
are, even when what they are seems so transparently obvious to every­
one around her, seems so paradoxical, so supremely ironic, that her 
involvement in ironies, if not her personal unhappiness itself, draws 
even the most ironical viewer into her orbit. 
And what is particularly ironic is that—like the governess in 
'The Turn of the Screw"—there is really not vory much interesting 
or mysterious about the woman except this very human involvement in 
mystery. 
* * * 
The "universal," therefore, which Janes has captured is a new-
kind of artistic reality, in which the pursuit, the involvement, the 
process is half the reality. No other writer, excepting, possibly, 
Conrad, has so effectively portrayed the complexity of this pursuit 
and the labyrinthic convolutions a raind must thread in order to 
illustrate it. 
If this kind of continually "open lid" to reality were not what 
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the reader looks for and expects, why would he go to art in the first 
place? 
One reason he goos, naturally, is for "vicarious experience." 
Or as Janes asks and answers half the question himself: 
tfhy should the representation be required, when 
the object represented is soaccessible? . . . 
The answer ... appears to be that man combines 
an infinite cunninn to getting it as cheaply as 
possible. He will steal it whenever h® can. He 
likes to live the lives of others, yet is well aware 
of the points at which it may too intollerably 
resemble his own. Hi® valid fable, mora than any­
thing else, gives him knowledge, abundant, yet 
vicarious.9 
And James responds to this need, because he, too, "feels himself 
all in the presence of an abyss of ambiguities, the mutual accoaraoda-
10 tion with which the reader leaves wholly to him": 
... (Uve us then the persons represented the 
subject of the bewilderment (that bewilderment 
without which there would be no quest of illusion 
or of the fact of suspense, prime implication in 
any story), as Much experience as possible ... 
Such, in effect, are the words in which the 
novelist constantly hears himself addressed, such 
the pleas made by the would be victims of his 
spell and ... he listens anxiously to the charge— 
nor again can exceed his solicitude for the economy 
of interest; but feels himself all in presence of 
an abyss of ambiguities, the mutual accomodation 
with which the reader wholly leaves hia. Experience, 
you see, the picture of the exposed and entangled 
state is what is required . . 
^The Future of the Novel, op. cit., p. 33. 
*°Tnc Future of the Novel, op. cit., p. 57. 
11An important part of the above quote has boen excluded—that 
part concerning the reader's demand that there not be too rauch be­
wilderment—but what is meant (as has been discussed previously) by 
"bewilderment" here is excessive intelligence which tends to dissipate 
illusion. 
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What anazed Janes was not the desire on the part of humanity 
and himself for bewildersnent, for illusion, this perverse desire to 
be "always in the rein of the great ambiguity:" (If I have called the 
taost general state of one's exposed and assaulted figures the state 
of beuilder»ent ... It is rather witless to talk of , . . getting 
12 
rid of that highly recowsended categories of feeling.") What amazes 
him is that people will be taken in or be involved in very paltry 
illusions: 
. . .  W h a t  remains is the interesting oddity of 
mystery—the anomaly that fairly dignifies the 
whole circumstance with its strangenents: the 
vender, in short, that men, women, and children 
should have so much attention to spare for 
Improvisations mainly so arbitrary, and fre­
quently so loose. That, at the first blush, 
fairly leaves us gaping. This great fortune 
then, since fortune it seems, has been reserved 
for aere unsupported and unguaranteed history, 
the inexpensive thing, written in the air, the 
record of what, in any particular case, has not 
been . , . This is the side of the whole busi-
ness of fiction cm which it can always be challenged,*3 
Involvement, that is, in illusions which don't meet the 
philosophical challenges of the fore. 
In fact, it is the novelist's responsibility not to provide 
"inexpensive illusions; because, in effect, inexpensive illusions 
leave the reader in illusion. They cause hi® to confuse illusion 
12 
The Future of the Novel, op. cit., p. S8. 
13 
Ibid., p. 32. 
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with the real thing; they do not cause him to recognize that his 
involvement or lack of involvement is what is real. They siaply, 
in other words, drown his in illusion. 
This is the truth about illusion which the artist must cause 
his render to realize. If he does so, he can then lean back in 
esthetic contemplation of his accomplishment, confident that the 
moral job has been dene, too. Which, incidentally, is the way 
lames expresses his satisfaction with Flaubert's esthetic (not 
moral) accomplishment in having produced Madamo i* ovary. 
. . .  M a y  i t  n o t  i n  t r u t h  b e  s a i d  t h a t  w o  
practice our industry, so nany of us, at 
relatively little cost just because poor 
Flaubert, producing the aost expensive fictions 
ever written, so handsomely paid for it? It is 
as if this put it in our power to produce cheap 
and thereby sell dear; as if, so expressing it, 
literary honor being by his example effectively 
secure for the firm at large and the general 
concern, on its whole esthetic side, floated once 
for all, we find our individual attention free 
for literary indifference 
Actually, the same praise Janes lavishes upon Flaubert he 
deserves himself—and for almost the sarao reason. Jones never pro­
vides inexpensive illusions in the place of the "real thing"; he is 
no less concerned than Flaubert in finding the exact detail, just 
the "right" word—except that he usually thinks in terms of the 
"picture." In fact, he found the novel of his day to be a failure. 
* The Future of the Novel, op. cit», j>. 145. (James, naturally, 
in no way''aibpt's esthetic indifference, anymore than he adopts 
moral indifference—although sometimes, because of his conscious 
use of ambiguity, ha seess to.) 
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"philosophically," in not providing "comprehensive pictures": 
There are people who have loved the novel, 
but who actually find themselves drowned in its 
verbiage, and for whom even in some of its proved 
manifestations, it is become a terror they exert 
every ingenuity, every hypocrisy, to evade, the 
indifferent and the alienated testify, at any rate, 
almost as nuch as the omnivorous, to the rein of 
the great ambiguity, the enjoyment of which rests 
evidently on a primary need of mankind. The 
novelist can only fall back on that—on his 
recognition that man's constant demand for what he 
has to offer is simply man's general appetite for 
a picture. The novel is of all pictures the most 
comprehensive and the most elastic. It will stretch 
anywhere, it will take in absolutely everything*15 
At the risk of repeating: To James's unique consciousness, 
physical, psychological, objective, subjective, ruminative entities 
are all "adorably pictoral," since they are always stained through 
the consciousness of his "reporters" and then refracted, still, 
as "adorably pictoral" entities through the minds of his readers. 
And since they are all "particulars" which are, at the same tirae, 
anomalous and ambiguous—any novel of which they are a composition 
is bound to be even more a "comprehensive picture"—"elastic," 
capable of •Stretching" anywhere and taking in "absolutely everything," 
if the writer keeps them so. 
If the artist didn't keep them so, his creations would be 
merely imitative, since any "particular case" is potentially nothing 
more than flat imitation. Zola's Preiser's, Morris's, Sinclair 
lsThe Future 
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Lewis*s works are full of such flat particulars—one-sided, quickly 
scanned and almost as quickly forgotten: topical, not typical 
entities that blaze out wonderfully for one reading, for one brief 
reflection, but hold up to no raore; because the "«icture," of which 
they are a summation, is not "comprehensive," but nerely peculiar— 
unique for a tine, but not unique all-of-the-time which is to be 
"classically unique." The "anomalous particular case" involves the 
reader at any tino, because it remains, in itself, an "anomalous-
ambiguity." 
What James seens to be implying (in terms of critical theory) is 
that—if a work resains "crystaline"—it will not only be unique—an 
original perception of life or totality, but that it will wore 
directly imitate an absolute which defies finite definition, a 
totality about which there will always be disagreement. 
The implication is that a work of art is a "classic," for in­
stance, in proportion to the number of meanings to be gotten fro® it. 
"Heart of Darkness" is an example, "The T\irn of the Screw" another. 
They can be read so many ways; so uany meanings can b© gotten out of 
them, or incorporated into tliem by the readers,16 that they can 
appeal to a greater diversity of tainds that disagree about life or 
16 
"It derives fro® its fira roundness that sign of all rare 
works that there is something in it for everyone": Henry James*s 
essay on Gustavo Flaubert, "Die Future of the Novel, op. cit., p. 
155, ' ' ' 
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totality,17 
But what appeals is not necessarily unity of ogre©went about 
what the work of art is saying about totality, but agreement that 
it is saying enough about it to satisfy people of all ages who will 
disagree about life or totality. Hie balance of artist and reader, 
therefore, is riot a pivotal point where most agree an the artist's 
perception of totality, but where most agree that he is portraying 
a totality which defies finite definition. Agreement about an 
artist's perception of a particular totality (the "naturalist's" 
world) creates an orthodox, popular work, popular for a particular 
tiiae; disagreement about an artist's particular perception of a 
totality that cannot be particularized, creates a classic, popular 
for all tiaes. 
What Jaaes does is to realize in his works the significant 
relationship between the abstract and the concrete, the general and 
the particular, and he realizes that awareness in terras of each— 
which, of course, neans that he deals in all approximations of each: 
the symbol, the idea, the image. lie tries to give the particular 
detail, the particular word all of the leeway it needs—a method 
which actually broadens its possibilities for aaking distinctions at 
the sane tino that it causes these distinctions to be raade. The 
*7"Hie novel is of all pictures the most comprehensive and the 
most elastic. It will stretch anywhere—it will take in absolutely 
anything , . Janes, Hie Future of the Move!, op. cit., p. 33. 
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fact that he gives his words "full rein" actually forces one to 
examine the "particular case" with much more zeal than one might do 
otherwise. fly givin?, the wore! full play, he forces one to find out 
what the particular case (of which the word is a representative) really 
is, instead of letting one assuae that the "word" (its general 
symbolical significance) is explanation enough of the object's 
existence. 
The essence of Jaaesian subtlety is that it frees the conscious­
ness to make its own extensions. Subtlety, that is, depends as much 
upon what is unsaid as said; it presumes awareness that what is un­
spoken (or left open to interpretation) is far taore effective at 
tiroes than what is explained away—if only because words limit 
consciousness at the saae ti»e that they facilitate it. By remaining 
crystaline, in the way that Janes tries to keep theia, words pry up 
greater aeaning by depending upon the total leverage of all that 
human minds can read into tiiera. 
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that because Janes puts 
so much emphasis upon the free word, on the "representation," on the 
"image,"— ("Hie image is always prior to the thing itself")-that he 
looks upon the word or the image or the representation as something 
jaore "real" than the fact. It may, in the classical sense, be 
"superior;" it say be something "more," than reality; but James does 
not necessarily mean that it is is ore "real." 
James valued "differences," "relationship,"*® the contraries 
18 This is tine ©esthetic's approach, which assumes that reality 
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of life as nuch as absolutes, He found in the representation of 
life real significance, but he did not say they are more real. They 
right hold life and reflect life and be like life, and even more 
perfectly realise life than people do; they nay even be nore paradoxi­
cal and bewildering; but this does not isean that life, to Jamas, was 
any loss real because of what the artist's representations can do 
roaler, Jaaes did not fall into that trap. In fact the full thrust 
of his irony, of his knowledge of paradox, o£ his ability to weave 
illusion and reality, is directed at this kind of consciousness. 
Professing no absolute vision of mystical truth, .Jaaes still 
realizes awareness of such by Mirroring, not eliminating, contraries. 
As before stated, a paradoxical condition of life is as auch a result 
of language as of fact* Even the word, "paradox," is an arbitrary 
is found not in one's involvement in "facts," or illusions in general, 
but only in life's representations. It sees truth only in the way 
something fulfills its obligation as an example—> as a syjabolieal 
approximation of another example. That is, it finds "representation," 
generally, to be acre "real than what it represents; it finds in 
life's artifacts its only real central and meaningful entity. This 
kind of consciousness eventually even looks upon itself as purely 
another representative. It denies itself "classical uniqueness." 
To this kind of consciousness, whatever reality is (whether 
it is a concrete fact or an abstract idea or a classical combination 
of the two), the syabol of it is far more vital. Such a conscious-
ness seldom touches upon life itself; instead it lives in its 
approximations, since life for such a consciousness is not itself 
real. Hhat is considered real is esipty synbolisc. Hi is is an 
empty paradoxical position which apparently recognizes no relation­
ship in the symbol to either a finite fact or an infinite idea. The 
symbol sight be referred to as an approximation of one or th® other; 
it might be referred to as an "objective correlative," for instance, 
but what is meant by such a comparison is that the object or idea 
more perfectly approximates the symbolI 
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fulcrum by which me balances contraries which possibly do not 
exist at all in total reality. Dualistic words, like "good and 
evil," "beauty and ugliness," "reality and illusion," manage to 
halve the world into contraries which may not exist at all except 
in the minds of those who use thera. They are symbolical approxima­
tions, no more or less, and Jaiaes must have realized this. 
But not to jairror contraries would be not to mirror the world 
as it appears to the ncm-mystic; and whatever paradox implies as a 
total condition, James accepted it, temporarily, as a conditicm only 
slightly aore central, possibly, that the conventions (illusions) 
it opposes. 
By maintaining, in other words, a propensity towards "classical 
inclusiveness," Jaaes satisfied not only the classicist, but the 
mystic as well. For what the classicist calls "finding the uni­
versal significance in the particular" is very similar (except in 
degree and intensity of awareness) to what the mystic calls "appre­
hending the Infinite within tli© finite," Both approaches to reality 
19 aim at a union of contraries, 
19 
The primary difference between these two approaches to 
reality is that the mystic asserts that—once having tal a mystical 
vision—he knows that a condition exists beyond paradox, beyond, 
that is, the contraries that paradox implies, a condition in which 
the abstract and the concrete are inseparably indivisible—whereas 
the classicist only assuaes it, meanwhile hoping to capture a 
balance of meaning within the limits of paradox itself. 
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When Van Wyck Brooks» therefore, says of Jaiaes's characters 
that they are the "fruits of an irresponsible imagination, of a 
deranged sense of values, of a mind working in a void, uncorrected 
by any clear consciousness of human cause and effect,"20 what Brooks 
is really demanding is final moral judgment. 
But to give final noral judgments, one has to b® an absolutist; 
and like Conrad and Melville and others of their caliber, Janes is 
21 not a moral absolutist. He is only an absolutist of technique. 
He aerely portrays, diligently, the battleground where good and evil, 
beauty and ugliness, reality and illusion vie with one another for 
supremacy, a world in which the innocent seek the knowledge of the 
non-innocent, lose their innocence when they think they have this 
knowledge, and then, in innocent ignorance of this knowledge, become 
innocent again. The truly innocent, as Jaoes says of Isabelle Archer, 
are those in whom "the love of knowledge co-exists with the finest 
capacity for ignorance." 
Jaaes evidently felt he himself maintained innocence by re-
saining out of his stories, by letting the reader sake most of the 
judgments and assumptions needing to be made. His morality, such as 
it is, is that his characters ostensibly retreat fron evil, if they 
think they have recognized it. The ambiguity inheent is that one 
20 
Van i/yck Brooks, New England Indian Summer, 1865-1915. op. cit. 
21 
They are all three moralists, but not moral absolutists. 
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cannot tell for sure with whom or What lie raakes ignorance synony­
mous: ignorance or knowledge, the Americans or Europeans, etc. He 
implies that the process of recognition warps, if it does not actually 
destroy; or that if it does not ivarp, it offers no escape. Jaaes's 
character Searle, in "A Passionate Pilgrim," says: "I was born with 
a soul for the picturesque ... 1 found it nowhere. I found the 
world all !;arsh linos and harsh light, without shade, without compo­
sition, without the lovely ssystery of colour." Janes went to Europe 
to enrich his esthetic soul, aid he learned there that sensitivity, 
like knowledge, can corrupt. lie apjiroachcd the beauty and art of 
Europe as a Puritan would approach the sensuality of Purs la. It 
seemed to hold for hio the suae kind of fascination, and it always 
seoned just out of his reach; he was always excluded fron the "iaagic 
circle." As Blackiaur says of James's kind of artist: "ho fairly 
22 ached to corrupt hiisself." 
Cut he found like Christopher Newman that "Europe keeps holding 
one at am's length." The tragedy of James, as a person, seems that 
he reraained, 03tnctically and morally, a virgin to the end: he never 
soc.-is to have fult utterly corrupted himself. He himself is always 
the inevitable innocent in all his works; as if he never thrust through 
the mystery whose corrupting aid re-generating he witnessed all around 
his. ilis morality, as such, is that his hero or heroine try to reject 
22 R. P. jilaekxiur, "The Country of the Blue," essay in The 
Question of .lenry Jaiaes, op. cit., p. 103. 
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ultimate knowledge, too. They retreat from evil or ugliness (or just 
plain isystery) rather than remain with it, unless, like Isabelle 
Archer and Daisy Miller, thoy retreat too late* 
Ja®es, as a person, never does seem to lose control—to enter his 
"Trie Country of the Blue." ile seems to remain always the observing 
artist and, secondarily, the human beinf; j and although his art seldom 
falters, his humanity becomes suspect. It does not seem really tested, 
isccause of his highly developed esthetic sense, which would not let 
him pursue ugliness too far, his morality seems to fall short of 
real depth (of the kind, for instance, which Conrad reveals by some 
of the saroe methods). And because of this, his art finally falls 
under suspicion, too. 
Yet it is quite possible that the evil or ugliness which James 
snjfiests--£or whatever reasons he does so—sore effectively reveal 
real sordidness than would the most explicit nataing of particulars. 
James saw himself as a romantic, end he is nsost often referred 
to by criticis as such. But his saanner is too incisive to put up 
with illusion, except for its own sake, lie was more a manipulator 
of romance than a romanticist, "The Art of the romancer," he said, 
"is for the fun of it, insidiously to cut the cable, to cut it 
without our detecting his," Janes could cut-tho-cable on his readers, 
but not «n his own ironic sensibility, sic constructed marvelously 
ingenious labyrinths, "catching" inside the labyrinths those who 
could be caught, remaining himself always in awe of those who could 
be caught (the Daisy Millers, the Isabelle Archers, the Maggie 
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Vervors), lie remained in awe, in other words, of those who respond 
imaginatively and unnechaitically to life—those who seess truly 
Mysterious !>e cause they are truly involved in mystery, lie hiasclf 
seenod never able to imaerse himself in what he considered the real 
substance of life--which is, ironically, "lw:wildenaent," lie could 
not seea to do, as Conrad insisted one should: "ianerse himself in 
the destructive element," 
For this reason James cannot really I« considered a tragedian. 
His heroes, for or© thin?, seldor» recognize their tragic flaw; and 
when, like Marcher in 'Tlie Beast in the Jungle," they do—no 
catharsis is there. Even Strether in The Ambassadors, vho corns 
close to sseinn himself, never makes the bridge with life which 
rsi*ht brinf hin into a taeaningful relationship with the world, 
Isabelle Archer is the closest of all to being a tragic figure in 
.Tnrses's fiction; but, as with ataost all of his protagonists (even 
those women in his later works), her alternatives are not truly 
tragic, 
"or is J sues a r. oralis tj his illusions, which appear to 
deliniato between good and evil, fail to do so, aid reesain ambiguous. 
And he is not really a rtystic either; because he does not see how 
the infinite reflections of act and consequence resolve themselves 
J* \ 
into a hamonious totality which is steaningftil be cause everything 
in that totality is seen to be equally responsible. This is knowledge 
2\ Or totally discordant, according to the mystic who soes it— 
that is, according to whether he is a "white" or "blade" nystic. 
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the nystic begins with; it is know led?;© the tragedian approaches; 
it is knowledge the moralist defends or renounces—quite often 
arbitrarily. It is knowledge the ironist never completely accepts, 
one way or the other. 
what Jafiies is, siuply, is an ironist--neith©r excessively 
romantic, or excessively misanthropic, ae is somewhere between— 
outside ids "Country of the iJlue." 
iiut this does not wean that his works are outside it, that they 
do not see, do not save. They siuply avoid absolutes; and in that 
sense they accurately sirror one aspect of lifts—tlie fact that life 
seems to be anbivalent and paradoxical. And in that sense they seeta 
to be real. 
Conrad, discussing Janes, is nost definitive on this point. 
if© says: "James's characters renounce the shadows;" and he says 
that such a solution by rejections 
. . .  m u s t  a l w a y s  p r e s e n t  a  c e r t a i n  l a c k  o f  
finality, especially startling when contrasted 
with the usual methods of solution by rewards 
mid punishments, by crowned love, by fortune, 
by a broken leg, or a sudden death ... Why 
the reading public, which as a body, has never 
laid upon a story-teller the corsnand to be an 
artist, should demand for hia this shame of 
divine omnipotence, is utterly incomprehensible. 
But so it is; and these solutions are legitimate 
inasmuch as they satisfy the desire for finality, 
for which our hearts yearn with a longing greater 
than the longing for the loaves and fishes of 
the earth. . « 
24Joseph Conrad, The juostion of Henry Janes, (od.) F. i>. 
Dupec, ag, cit., p, 45. 
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Conrad concludes: "One is never set at rest by Mr. Henry 
Jaaes's novels, ilis book ends as an episode in life ends. You 
remain with the sense of life still poinj? on." 
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